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Summary findings
The case in Mexico City offered an opportunity to  the past decade alone. And by virtue of its location and
observe the advantages and disadvantages of gradualist  elevation, the city's alternative water sources are
reform. Unfortunately Haggarty, Brook, and Zuluaga  expensive. The need for change is stark, but the power to
find that the long-term nature of an incremental  undertake  reform to tackle broad problems of resource
approach does not match well with the generally shorter-  management in the city and surrounding  areas lies
term horizons of elected politicians. Difficult decisions in  outside the jurisdiction of the D.F. with the federal
implementation are left to later years, which pushes  government. Such external funding of major supply
potentially unpopular actions onto the shoulders of  projects weakens the incentives for conservation. Reform
future administrations, while allowing the current  reduced the increasing rate of overexploitation of the
government to claim credit for instituting reform.  aquifer, but partly by simply failing to meet demand.
The reform planned-and  implemented-was  not  Reform to provide more equitable and sustainable
designed to tackle the city's most serious water problems,  water  delivery must focus on improving the efficiency of
including overconsumption  and waste. And reform did  operations, on substantially reforming the way water
little to change residential consumers' incentives to  resources are priced and allocated, and on the design,
conserve water.  management, and pricing of wastewater services. Federal
Overexploitation  of the aquifer has been a problem  subsidies for new production  must be reduced, prices for
since at least the 1930s. Mexico City is built on a series  system operators  and consumers must rise, and more
of drained lakebeds, and the land is soft and prone to  must be invested in the treatment and storage of
settling, or subsiding, as the aquifer is depleted. Several  wastewater-all  of which requires strong political
areas of the city center have sunk by over two meters in  leadership.
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3I.  INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s Mexico City - more precisely the Distrito Federal (D.F.) -
seeking to reform and improve urban water services, initiated a set of service contracts
with private sector partners.  UWhile  service contracts are commonplace in the water and
sanitation sectors, the Mexico City reform has two unusual features. First, it involved not
one but  four private sector operators. Second, the contract with each operator was to be
implemented in three stages over a ten-year period.  These features are of interest to the
extent that the Mexico City experience can tell us something about the use of multiple
private partners and progressive step processes to increase the benefits and sustainability
of private sector reforms in water.
The decision to involve four operators introduces the possibility of competitive
pressures  for  improved  performance  through  comparisons  and  benchmarking.  The
decision to use a staged approach is of interest to the extent that it can shed light on the
question of  whether "gradualist"  approaches to  private  sector participation are more
effective in  reducing the kind of  social and political opposition often faced by more
radical forms of private involvement.  In particular, a gradualist approach holds out the
possibility of introducing the private sector over an extended period, thus building up
confidence and trust within the government and among the general population.  It may
also  allow  the government to  address pricing  problems  and  introduce or  strengthen
regulatory arrangements on a gradual basis after securing private partners - reducing the
risk of potentially politically costly price shocks, and  allowing careful attention to the
design of regulatory arrangements.
Incremental reforms also present risks, however.  The long-term nature of such
plans does not fit well with the generally shorter-term horizons of politicians, particularly
in electoral government systerns.  The difficult decisions in the implementation of such
plans  are often left to  the later years so as to push potentially unpopular actions onto
future administrations while allowing the current government to claim that it is instituting
reforms  (Brook  Cowen,  1997).  The Mexico  City  case presents  an  opportunity for
observing the advantages and disadvantages of gradualist reforms in practice.
More broadly, the case is  of interest  because the chosen  reform tackled only
tangentially, and in a limited way, what is perhaps the most serious long-term issue in the
water and sewerage sector in the city: the improved management of a scarce and fragile
4water resource.  An understanding of the constraints that produced this  result and the
implications  it  had  on  reform  effectiveness may  help  give  a  better  sense  of  the
prerequisites for fully effective sectoral reforms.
This  paper  seeks  to  address the  following questions:  What  were  the  factors
motivating and constraining reform - and why did the reform take the form it did?  Once
implemented, to  what  extent  did  the  reform  follow the  intended  path,  and  produce
expected outcomes?  To the extent that there was divergence from the intended path, why
did this occur?
The paper is set out as follows.  Section II describes the conditions in the sector
and  the  city prior  to  reform.  Section III discusses political  factors motivating  and
constraining reform.  Section  IV describes the service  contract approach  adopted in
Mexico  City, and  Section  V  describes the  implementation  experience.  Section  VI
discusses the outcomes of the reform.  Section VII looks at the extent to which the reform
had any impact on the broader policy issues of water resource management, pollution
control and improved services to the poor.  Some conclusions are set out in Section VEII.
5II.  CONDITIONS  IN THE W ATER SECTOR PRIOR TO RLEFORM4
11.1  Historical  and Macroeconomic  Circumstances  Leading  to Reform
We  generally  expect  reforms  involving  substantial,  long-term  private  sector
participation (PSP) to be easier to implement when motivated by a strong or long-termn
crisis than by a mild or temporary crisis.  In Mexico, while a macro-economic crisis did
help to precipitate reformn  of the Federal District's water system, the resulting reform was
a rather limited one, that deferred difficult political decisions.
(i) The Precipitating Crisis. In 1982 the "Mexican miracle" of over three decades
of strong economic growth ended abruptly. 1 Easy foreign credit, fueled by vast quantities
of petro-dollars, had been used t;o  prop up the overextended and inefficient Mexican state.
The sudden disappearance of these propelled Mexico into deep economic crisis: GDP
contracted by over 4% and inflation rose to over 100% in  1983.2 GDP contracted again
in 1986 and inflation continued at levels between 50 and 130 percent. The government of
President de la Madrid (1982-19388)  took a number of steps to curb the decline, including
a large privatization programn.
In 1987, towards the end of de la Madrid's six year term,  inflation was soaring to
over  130 percent  annually  de,spite multiple  austerity programs  and  growth was  still
elusive.  The ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was suffering defections
on both the left and the right and facing the most vigorous electoral opposition in  its
history.  To  stave off  a renewed round of capital  flight and  a loss of confidence by
investors,  President  de  la  Madrid  ignored dissenters  within  the  PRI  and  chose  his
technocratic Minister of Budget:  and Planning (SPP), Carlos Salinas de Gortari, as the PRI
presidential candidate.  This increased the internal divisions within the party leading to
the defection of a number of high level party members who formned  a left wing opposition
coalition, the Frente Democratico Nacional  (FDN).  The outcome  of the presidential
elections in 1988 shocked the P'RI. For the first time parties on both the left and the right
hotly contested a presidential election.  President Salinas was elected with only 50.7% of
the vote, although many believe that the counting process was so plagued by fraud that
During the decade before the crisis (1972-81), GDP had grown at an annual rate of over 7% inflation
had generally been low by Latin Amnerican  standards (WDI, 1997).
2  WDI, 1997
6Salinas' margin of victory would have been much smaller had the election been fully free
and fair. 3
In the face of continued sluggish economic growth of slightly more than 1 percent
and inflation of over  100 percent in  19884, President Salinas decided to push reforms
further and faster.  In 1989 his economic cabinet approved the divestiture of all public
enterprises in sectors not expressly classified as "strategic" in the constitution (Teichman,
1995).  This opened up  a number of sectors to private participation where it had not
previously been considered, including infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications,
energy and water.
The water sector was targeted for early reform (Buras, 1996).  In  1989, a new
federal water policy aimed at increasing the efficiency of water usage by decentralizing
management to  state level water commissions.  The administration also passed  a new
water law in 1992 that a) established the concept of water as a commodity (rather than a
"social good"); b) endorsed the use of market mechanisms to manage water resources and
c) promoted local participation in water management (ibid).  State water commissions
were established with control over and responsibility for water services in their areas.
And reform of service providers was decentralized - thus providing a framework for
private participation.
1I.2  The  Water Sector  in Mexico  City
Mexico City had for a long time faced acute problems in the water and sanitation
sectors.  Some of these problems - such as weak and fragmented arrangements for the
management of water and sanitation services, inadequate maintenance, poor billing and
collections performance and entrenched under-pricing relative to service costs - were, at
least in theory, solvable through a well-designed program to engage the private sector in
service delivery.  Other problems - most notably involving the protection and sustainable
management of water resources in the Valley of Mexico and surrounding states - were
likely to be less tractable.
3  Centeno, 1994, Purcell, 1995.  There are also a minority of scholars who claim Salinas would have
lost the election entirely had it been fair. See Reding, 1989.
4  WDI, 1997.
7This  section focuses on three key factors: the scarcity of water resources and
therefore the high  opportunity cost  of meeting the city's  needs, the high  demand for
services,  and  the  fragmentation  of  responsibilities for  the  provision  of  water  (and
sewerage) services in the  city.  It  then provides data on  the performance of service
providers in the city prior to reforn.
(i) Scarcity of Water Resources.  The availability of raw water resources to supply
the D.F. is seriously constrained by geographic factors. Mexico City is built on the floor
of a drained lake - the site of the former Aztec city Tenochtitlan - high in a mountain
valley.  The city has a long and precarious hydrological history, combining severe water
shortage with severe flooding.  Both have been combated by heroic engineering projects
to mine the aquifer underlying the city, to bring water from ever more distant river valleys
which are one kilometer, in altitude, below the city, and to provide drainage away from
the city for wastewater and floodwaters.
At the time of the reforms (1993) total water production for the D.F. was around
35.3 m3/second.  (In  the  Valley of  Mexico  as a  whole,  production  was  around  60
m3/second.) 5 The greater part of Mexico City's  water was drawn from  the aquifers
underlying the city, from wells with depths of 70 to 200 meters.  Most of the rest of the
water came from two distant sources: the well fields in the Lerma Basin (60 kilometers
distant), and the Cutzamala River (127 kilometers distant, and  some  1,200 meters in
altitude below the city) 6. Table 1 summarizes the main water sources for the Federal
District.
Table 1: Raw Water Sources for the Federal District (1993)
Raw Water Sources  Total Supply (m3/second)  Share of Total Supply (%)
Internal (Basin of Mexico)  23.4  66.3
Irnported Sources  11.9  33.7
Total Water Supply  35.3  100.0
Source: Joint Academies  Conmnittee  on the Mexico  City  Water  Supply,  1995.
The extraction rate from the aquifer (for the metropolitan area as a whole) was
around 42 m3/second, while the replenishment rate was only around 24 m3/second. From
1986 to  1994 alone the aquifer beneath the central sections of the city dropped by 6-14
5  Joint  Academies,  1995, p. 21.
6  ibid  p. 22.
8meters (DGCOH, 1994).  Because Mexico City is built on a series of drained lakebeds,
the land is soft, and prone to subsidence as the aquifer is depleted. Since the beginning of
groundwater exploitation in the late 19th century, the downtown area of the D.F. has sunk
by an average of 7.5 meters.  Several areas of the city center have sunk by over 2 meters
in  the  last  decade  alone  (ibid).  By  virtue  of  its  location and  elevation,  the  city's
alternative water sources are expensive ones.  For example, plans are currently underway
to bring an additional 5 m  3/second  to the D.F. and the State of Mexico from a new source
some  140 kilometers distance and  1000 meters lower in elevation, at an cost of around
US $500 million.
From a water resource perspective, therefore, the need for change would seem
stark.  However, the  power  to  undertake  reforms  that could tackle  the wider  water
resource  management  problems of  the  city  and  surrounding  region  lies outside  the
jurisdiction of the D.F..  Therefore, any reforms that the D.F. could feasibly implement
would  be,  at  most,  a  partial  contribution  to  resolving  these  problems.  Similarly,
responsibility for developing and funding new water sources, outside of the district does
not fall directly on the D.F. but rather on the Federal Government.  Such external funding
of major supply projects means that the incentive to reform, so as to conserve on the very
large costs associated with new supplies is weakened.
(ii) Demand.  Demand for water services was large and growing. Mexico City has
one of the largest populations in the world.  The D.F. has been growing rapidly: from a
population of 4.8 million in 1959 it had grown to 8.5 million by the early 1990s (Gamboa
de Buen, 1994).  The Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico, in which the city is
located, supported a population of 15 million (Joint Academies, 1995).
At the time  of the reforms, Mexico City had a relatively high rate of  existing
connections by developing country standards.  As can be seen from Table 2, ninety-five
percent of residents in 1990 had access to potable water in their houses or on their lots
through  the  formal  distribution  network,  and  over  85  percent  had  direct  sewerage
connections. 7 Such high  levels  of connection generally reduces one  of  the possible
motivations for attracting private capital since it does not require large new investment
7  There is some evidence that the official census overstates coverage rates because it tends to
undercount low-income, self-housing (see Joint Academies, 1995 p.270) however it is difficult to
estimate the significance of the variation.
9for the expansion of the network.  While new investment was potentially needed to tap
new sources of bulk supply, both to satisfy growing household needs and to take pressure
off the aquifer, to expand wastewater treatment and to rehabilitate the ageing network,
none but the last was contemplated as part of this reform.
Table 2: Water and Sewerage Services Coverage in the D.F. in 1990 and 1995
Water Sernices  1990  1995  Sewerage  Services  1990  1995
Inside  the  house  71.5%/  76.760/
Inside  the lot  23.5°/ 20.41°/  _
Total  Direct  Water  Coverage 95.00/o  97.170/ Direct  Sewerage  Coverage  85.7% 91.3°/
Standpipes  1.3°/  0.71°/  Septic  Tank  6.80/  4.80/o
.Total  Water  Coverage  96.30  9.8/Total  SeeaeCoverage  92.50/  96.10/
Source:  Census  1990  and  1995,  INEGI.
(iii) Fragmentation of Sectoral Responsibilities.  The management of the city's
water distribution and sewerage system at the time of reforms in 1992 was fragmented
and weak. There was no water utility, in the conventional sense; rather, responsibility for
service delivery was spread across three distinct sets of institutions each answering to a
different part of the District government. (See Table 3).
Table 3: Administrative Arrangements in the Water Sector Pre-reform (1991).
Agency  Responsibility|  Reports to
DGCOH  Construction and maintenance of primary  Secretary of Works and
water and sewer networks  Services (DF)
Delegaciones  Construction and maintenance and  Secretary of Government
operation of secondary water and sewerage  (DF)
I networks.  I_I
Treasury  Meter reading, billing and collections  Secretary of Finance (DF)
Direccion  General  de  Construcion y  Operacion Hydraulica  (DGCOH) - The
DGCOH was the primary agency responsible for water infrastructure within the D.F. and
its budget was set and monitored as part of the overall budget allocated to the Secretary of
Works  and  Services.  While  its  principal mandate was to  construct and  operate the
primary  network  and  water  treatment  plants,  it  also  did  a  significant  amount  of
construction and repair of the secondary network.  Some observers describe it as a slush
fund for the delegaciones (see below) because it frequently supplied them with material,
10engineering and labor to carry out repairs or extensions of the secondary network 8. Such
an arrangement was politically useful as the Mayor could redistribute resources without
indicating this in formnal  budget documents. DGCOH's  staff was generally perceived as
highly professional, but strongly oriented toward construction rather than operation and
maintenance of the existing system. For example, its reports measured impact principally
in terms of network kilometers added, treatment plants constructed and cubic meters of
water  produced. 9 Since DGCOH  had  no  revenue  collection  role  this  may not  be
surprising.
Delegaciones - Tasks relating to the operation and maintenance of the secondary
distribution network were the responsibility of the city's  16 delegaciones, political sub-
units who report to the Secretary of Government and the Mayor.  Their operational arms
are thus subject to strong political influences. Indeed, delivery of water services were put
under  the direction of  the politically oriented  Secretary of  Government rather than a
technical Secretariat such as Works and Services.  One of the roles of the delegacion
water department was to decide who would receive water and when.  Because there was
not  enough water within  all of  the delegaciones to  meet demand, particularly in  the
poorer  areas of  the city, the  delegacion water department would ration consumption
through a  pre-announced schedule of  intermittent supply.  Good time series  data on
intermnittent  supply was not  available but even in 1998 there were areas of the city that
received water once a week and sometimes once every nine days. 10 Such a situation was
ripe for political exploitation and there have long been allegations that water shortages are
created and then resolved by party officials to ensure voter loyalty (Coulomb, 1994).
Good historical data on labor within the delegacion water departments was not
available, however current estimates provide a reasonable picture of their size.  In 1998
the average delegacion water and  sewerage operations employed about 300 people.1'
Field interviews reveal that overstaffing was common and was estimated at about fifty
percent, largely the result of years of political patronage.  Workers in the water sector,
8  Field  interviews  in DGCOH  and several  Delegaciones.
9  DGCOH  Cornpendio,  various  years.
10  Field interviews  in Tlalpan  and  Itztapalapa  and DGCOH  1998b.
I  Obtaining  detailed  information  on the water  operations  of the various  delegations  has  been difficult
since  they  vary  tremendously  in size  and institutional  arrangements,  for example,  in 1998  the central
delegacion  of Benito  Juarez  had 130  people  working  on the water  and drainage  system  whereas  the
Southeastern  delegacion  of Iztapalapa  had 1,000. (Field  interviews)
11like those of the rest of the D.F. government, were highly unionized and labor rules made
it nearly impossible to reduce the work force.
Treasury - Before refonn responsibility for billing and collection rested with the
D.F.  Treasury.  In  part  this  was justified  on  the  basis  that  the  DGCOH  and  the
delegaciones lacked the requisite financial expertise, but this arrangement also fit well
with the centralized political structure of the D.F.  By centralizing billing and collection
within the Treasury, the Mayor was able to control all flows of funds and thus ensure that
all  the  delegaciones  would  be  dependent  on  his  office  and  unable  to  finance  an
independent power base.
(iv)  Sectoral  Performance.  Under  these  arrangements, the  management  of
operations was weak, creating scope for gains from private participation. The pressure on
bulk water resources could have been significantly lessened by reducing consumption and
waste, but little was done to effect this.  Aggregate water use in the D.F. was high by both
industrialized  and  developing  country standards.  Total  water consumed  by  the  city,
measured by water produced over population covered, was about 379 liters per person per
day in  1993.  This was exceptionally high  in comparison with consumption levels in
Europe which average between 200-300 liters per person per day (Figure 1). In part, these
high "consumption" figures reflect high physical losses. However, they are also likely to
result in part from lax billing, and from tariffs set well below the cost of delivering water
to households.
Figure 1: Per Capita Water Production in Selected Cities (1990)
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Alilcante  Santa  Catarina  Santiago  Bogota  Sao  Paulo  Distrito  Federal
Source.  M  e.ico  OGCOH.  Other countries Yepes  and Dianderus. 1996.  All  fiacres  1990 except Sao Paulo which is 1988.
1 2The  ratio  of  unaccounted-for-water  (physical  plus  commercial  losses  to
production) was high by developing country standards (see Table 4). Given the cost of
new water sources, these losses imply a substantial financial burden - if not for the D.F.
itself, for the country as a whole.
Table 4: Comparative Statistics on Water Loss
City / Country  Year  % Physical  % Total UfW
Losses
Bogota, Colombia  1991  14  40
San Jose, Costa Rica  1990  21  46
Dakar, Senegal  1993  n.a.  29
Manila, Philippines  1988  n.a.  59
Mexico City  1992  37]  5  1 2
Sao Paulo, Brazil  1992  n.a.  40
Sources: For all cases other than Mexico: Yepes and Dianderas, 1996. For Mexico, 1- DGCOII Plan Maestro, 1997 is the only
estimate of losses available and is expected to have been the same in 1992 and 2 -authors'  lower bound estimates.
Such high physical losses reflected poor maintenance. At the time of reform there
was no program to detect and repair non-visible leaks in the secondary network and leak
detection in the primary network used outmoded technology. 12 Leakage problems were
aggravated by land subsidence since water and drainage pipes are buckled and broken as
the city sinks.
As for commercial losses, in 1992 over  22 percent of all connections were not
registered.  Even those customers who were registered and did receive a water bill often
did not pay.  While 53 percent of registered customers had meters installed most of them
were not being read regularly.  According to Ochoa (1998), prior to reforms the Treasury
received regular paymenits from only 500,000 customers out of an average of 1,200,000
bills sent out.13 Using a combination of data from the census and the Comision de Aguas
del Distrito Federal (CADF) and the most favorable assumptions we estimated maximum
collection efficiency (collections/total billed) in 1992 at 62%.
12  This was a very serious problem is some sections of the city, particularly the South and South-East
where large caverns have been detected in the late 1  990s from long undetected leaks which were
spraying water down. (Field Interviews with Delegations)
13  Ochoa, 1998 (nimeo) p. 7
13Not  all  of  these  usage  problems  could  have  been  addressed  by  private
participation alone.  Tariff policy was also  at fault, providing little incentive to  those
customers who did receive a metered bill to reduce their consumption. Between 1970 and
1990 water tariffs had  been changed just  five times and by  1992 tariffs covered only
around 28 percent of operating expenses plus investments, excluding interest and debt
(For a more detailed discussion see section V).  The combination of low tariffs and poor
billing and collection practices resulted in low revenues that in 1992 covered just  54% of
operating costs.
Labor productivity was also poor by international standards (see Table 5). For
exarnple, Mexico City had three times as many employees per thousand connections in
the pre-reform period as did Lima, Peru.
Table 5: Comparative Labor Productivity Figures
Country/City  Year*  Employees / '000 connections
Guinea (Conakry)  1989  20.0
Ivory Coast  1987  8.3
Mexico City§  1992  13.4
Peru (Lima)  1991  4.6
USA (average)  1990  2.7
*For all cases except the USA, year chosen is that preceding a reform attempt.
§ Employment figures for Mexico City have been calculated based on actual figures for the DGCOH, reported figures for Treasury
employees involved in billing and collections for water, and estimates of delegacion employment for water services.
sources:  [Other case studies];  for USA, Yepes and Dianderas (1996), p.  17.
(v) Sector Circumstances and the Impetus for  Reform. In sum in  1992 the water
system in  Mexico City faced serious problems.  Demand was high,  the  aquifer was
declining, the city was sinking, and alternative sources of new water were expensive.
Weak operations and  maintenance lowered efficiency and increased  costs while  low
tariffs and deficient cost recovery aggravated the water supply problem.
Yet many factors made a radical reform involving private participation, such as a
concession, unlikely.  For one thing this "crisis" was not new.  Over-extraction of the
aquifer had been recognized as a problem since at least the 1930s and the city had already
committed to  two  very  expensive projects  for importing  water from  distant sources.
Moreover, ultimate responsibility for developing these sources - and carrying a heavy
share of the costs - was largely borne by the Federal Government. The price charged to
the D.F. for bulk water delivered to the city did not reflect the investment costs, and the
14D.F. had a long history of not charging the opportunity cost for water extracted from the
aquifer. 14 The problems that motivated the city to seek private participation were largely
operational, poor billing and collection, lack of maintenance of the secondary network
and  overmanning.  Addressing even these problems required  some difficult political
decisions, as we show in the next section.
III. POLITICAL  CIRCUMSTANCES  LEADING TO REFORM OF WATER
In the previous section, we showed how the physical and organizational state of
water services in Mexico City made them ripe for reform. In this section, we consider the
political factors that created the possibility of reform, while simultaneously constraining
the shape that reform could take.  The section begins with a discussion of how a political
crisis caused the ruling party to focus on urban water services in the country as a whole,
while  the D.F.'s  political  structure  created favorable circumstances  in  Mexico  City.
Disillusionment with reform under public operation led the government to choose private
sector  participation.  We  will  then  show  how,  notwithstanding  these  favorable
circumstances, the configuration of likely winners and losers from reform, combined with
long-standing political sensitivities surrounding access to and pricing of water services,
made thorough-going reformn  politically difficult.
H1.1  Political Factors Favoring Water Reform  and Private Sector Participation
(i)  Water Reform  and  the Electoral  Fortunes  of the PRI.  Rapid urbanization in
Mexico, among other factors,  led to  a  crisis  in Mexico's  ruling party, the  PRI.  In
response  to  this  crisis  the  ruling  administration  launched  programs  to  expand  and
improve urban services.  While initially politically successful, at least in the D.F., these
programs proved to be  unsustainable.
The roots of the PRI's  crisis were in the Party's corporatist structure.  The party
was organized into three different sectors: the peasant sector, the labor sector and the
"popular" sector that was meant to accommodate everyone else.  Each of these "sectors"
was in turn composed of numerous party organizations through which important parts of
14  Field interview with CNA.
15the support base (e.g. rural peasants, urban unionized labor, teachers, businessmen, etc.)
were meant to interact with the ruling party.
Figure  2: Percent  of the Vote  Won  by the PRI  in Congressional  Elections
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implemented in response to
popular demands  for  greater  democracy.  However, although  these reforms  allowed
greater opposition representation in the legislature, they did not  seriously endanger the
PRI's national hegemony (see Annex 1). More important to the dramatic fall in support
between 1982 and  1988 were the economic austerity programs instituted by the de la
Madrid administration, which reduced the resources that could be distributed by corporate
or local Party leaders (Gomez Tagle, 1993 and Baer, 1993).
Figure  3: PRI  Electoral  Fortunes  in D.F. Congressional  Elections  1975-1988
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(Basafiez,1993).  The
Party's  structure had been designed for the political realities of the  1930s and was not
well suited to incorporate the growing urban lower and middle classes. Thus, the PRI was
losing ground even more rapidly in urban areas than in the nation as a whole, this was
especially true in the D.F. (
16Figure 3).  In particular the PRI had been ineffective at incorporating "Popular Urban
Movements" (Movimientos Urbanos Populares- MUPs) that had come to represent an
increasingly  important  segment  of  society  since  the  1970s.  These  autonomous
associations were formed in an effort to secure services for the lower classes in many
urban and peri-urban areas throughout Mexico.  Because the PMI  had failed to draw these
organizations into its corporatist structures, the large numbers of migrants who moved to
the city were largely uninvolved in the Party (Ramirez Saiz, 1992 and  Haber,  1993).
Although not traditionally active in electoral politics, there is evidence that a number of
these organizations and their members participated and heavily favored the leftist Frente
Democratico Nacional (FDN) in the 1988 elections (Centeno 1994, Klesner 1996, Haber
1996).
Despite winning the 1988 presidential elections, the PRI did poorly in most urban
areas and in the D.F. in particular; winning just 27% of the vote, compared to 48% won
by the FDN and 22% for the right wing Partido Accion Nacional (PAN).  In the D.F. the
FDN dominance was near total, Cardenas took 37 any of the 40 electoral districts (13
with over 50% of the vote) while Salinas did not win a single electoral district.15
After  the  narrowest  presidential  electoral  victory  in  PRI  history  the  Salinas
administration launched a concerted effort to recapture lost electoral ground, particularly
in areas that were  seen to  have defected to  the FDN.  Aggressive new participatory
programs were launched to raise the rates of delivery of public services to the poor with
strong emphasis on potable water and sewerage.  The largest component, about 40% of
total expenditure (Lustig 1994) of the largest of these programs, PRONASOL, was water
and  sewerage which has  been described as the "heart  of PRONASOL"  (Bailey and
Boone,  1994) 16 17
'5  This section draws on data from Calderon Alzati, and  Cazes, 1991. The FDN coalition also presented
a unified list (single coalition candidates) in the D.F. Senate races and won both with 39% of the total
vote. The coalition members could not agree on single candidates for congressional seats and so did
not win a single district.  The PRI won 26 congressional districts while the PAN won 14.
16  The actual targets of these programs has been the subject of some debate, with the administration
claiming that they exclusively targeted the poor while numerous opposition figures, as well as political
scientists, have claimed that the expenditures were politically driven.  However Molinar Horcasitas
and Weldon (1994) clearly shows that the programs were, at least in part, driven by electoral politics.
They demonstrate  that PRONASOL expenditures in 1990 were targeted precisely at areas that the
Salinas administration wished to recover electorally in 1991. A significant portion of these funds was
spent on areas that had voted for the FDN in 1988 (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1994)
'7  The underlying assumption of this strategy was that many of those who voted for the FDN in 1988 did
so to protest the economic hardships they had undergone during the stabilization period of 1982-88
17The strategy was highly effective in reversing PRI's  electoral fortunes  in the
capital.  By the time the 1991 Congressional (and D.F. Assembly) elections took place,
the PRI had gained 46% of the D.F. votes in the senate and deputy elections and taken all
delegaciones  in the local assenmbly  elections. (IFE, 1991)
In the D.F., however, the strategy was not sustainable in the long run because it
failed to address the underlying resource constraint or to reduce the high cost of the D.F.
water  system to the  Federal  Government. 8  For  many years the D.F.  had  run  large
budgetary deficits which were routinely covered by the Federal Government (Segundo
Informe Annual, 1990 and Gamboa de Buen,  1994).  Prior to  1989, the D.F. received
some 75% of its  total budget from Federal funding through either revenue sharing or
budgetary transfers  (Beristain,  1995).  The water system was one  of the two  largest
expenditure categories in the D.F. budget (the other was the Metro).  Transfers to the D.F.
were unsustainable for two reasons: (i) low oil prices and greater difficulty in borrowing
internationally had made federal funds scarce and (ii) such large subsidies to the D.F. did
not fit with Salinas'  shift in focus to poorer communities.  Therefore one of President
Salinas' main concerns for the D.F. was to find a way to increase internally generated
revenues, and yet continue to maintain the political gains among the poorer sections of
the population.
(ii) Structure of the Distrito Federal and the Rise of Camacho. Another  important
factor  affecting the  shape  of  the  D.F.  water reform  was  the  dominant  role  of  the
Presidency in local  administration.  Unlike every other state and municipality in  the
republic, the D.F. did not have a popularly elected mayor until 1997. 19  For most of the
last 50 years) the D.F. mayor was a direct presidential appointee who automatically held a
and not because they were ideologically committed to the FDN (and later the Partido de la Revoluci6n
Democritica - PRD).  This appears to have been the correct diagnosis as the urban poor in general,
and MUPs in particular, were not attached to any political party but proved to be more pragmatic in
their voting patterns, supporting whoever would meet their demands. Dresser, 1994.
18  In fact these programs could exacerbate problems within an unreformed system by increasing water
shortages and the percentage of water lost to leakage since the participatory program work was
frequently of a lower standard. (Field Interviews)
19  The Federal District of Mexico (D.F.) has existed as an entity since 1824 but was given its current
form by a Presidential decree in 1928. This was in response to two basic problems; the inability of
some of the local municipal governments to deliver services due to their poor financial state and the
political infighting between factions in various municipalities which made coordinated city
management impossible. Ward, 1989
18high  cabinet  position  in the  Federal  Government.  The  D.F.  itself  is broken  up  into  16
political  units or municipalities  known  as delegaciones.  Each  delegacion  is controlled  by
a local  municipal  head  or delegado,  and  the president  also had  the power  to  appoint  or
confirm  the  mayor's  nominee  for  these  positions.  The  D.F.  did  (and  does)  elect
deputies  to the lower  house  of Congress  as well  as two senators,  just  as in any other  state,
and  during  the early years of this reform  (until  1993-94)  the national  Congress  carried out
all legislative  duties for the Federal  District.2'
In 1988 President  Salinas  appointed  Manuel  Camacho  Solis  as Mayor  and  part of
his remit  was to reduce  the D.F. burden  on the Federal  budget.  Mayor  Camacho  saw the
D.F. as a stepping  stone to the Presidency  in 1994.  To serve his  goals and reduce  the D.F.
dependence  on  Federal  funds,  the  Mayor  had  to  build  a  strong  support  base  within  the
D.F. (field  interviews).
Figure 4: Robbery Statistics in the D.F. 1980-90
One way the Camacho
administration  built  this
support  was  by  crushing  a
crime  wave.  As  can  be  seen
from  Figure  4,  the  robbery 
rate  in  1987  was  more  than  _
double  that  of  1982.
According  to  ex-Mayor
Camacho  the  statistics  for
other  crimes  were  equally
bad;  bank  robberies  and  J
break-ins  to homes  were at all
time  highs.  Both  Camacho  and  a  former  aide  stated  that  the  dramatic  decline  in crime
rates  after they took  office  was of critical  importance  in  establishing  the  administration's
credibility2 2. Whether  or not the Camacho  administration  was actually responsible  for the
20  This entire section of the structure of the DF government draws heavily on Ward, 1989
21  The Federal District Representative Assembly was created as a popularly elected body in 1986 but had
limited authority during most of the reform period when it acted as a "consultative body of the mayor"
(Gomez Tagle 1993). The Assembly would not become a truly integral part of the ruling of the D.F.
and gain legislative authority until the mid-  I  990s.
22  Separate interviews with Manuel Camacho and Ignacio Marvan in Mexico City, 1997.
19declines is less important than the political support generated from the perception that the
new administration had addressed the crime situation effectively.
According to the ex-Mayor, the middle and upper classes, who felt themselves to
be the targets of crime, were grateful for the reduction and therefore presented much less
opposition to  other policy changes.  In particular when the administration announced
raises in property taxes and water rates in  1990 they met less than expected resistance.
These extra funds, in turn, allowed the administration to increase spending in poorer areas
of  the city in their effort to reverse the PRIs  political fortunes.  In keeping with his
national priorities, President Salinas did reduce transfers to the D.F.  and, by 1993, the
D.F. became a net contributor to the rest of the Federal Republic (field interviews) 23.
The PRI's  strong showing in the 1991 mid-tern  elections set the stage for more
ambitious  reforms.  The  Salinas  government  launched  the  national  water  reforms
described above, and the D.F. i-ntroduced  contracts with the private sector.
(iii.)  Why Private  Sector  1'articipation?  The question naturally arises as to why
the D.F. chose private sector participation to reform their water sector.  The main reason
was disillusionment with prior efforts to reform public enterprises. Under President de la
Madrid, the national government had implemented a series of performance contracts in an
attempt to improve state-owned enterprise performance.  By the early 1990s these efforts
were perceived to be having little positive effect and the government had shifted the focus
of the program to the privatization of state-owned enterprises.
Similarly, in  the  D.F.,  the  Camacho  administration  had  initially  put  greater
emphasis on the ongoing public sector reform attempt, the Programa  de Uso Eficiente  del
Agua (PUEDA).  This reform, begun in  1986, sought to improve the administration of
water services by carrying out a user census, installing residential meters and promoting
more efficient use of water, mainly through the improved technologies (toilets, sinks and
faucets).  However by 1992 thie  program was judged to be progressing too slowly; inter-
23  This is confirmed by the analysis in Beristain, 1995.  While transfers were still positive (though very
small) the D.F. was contributing more in taxes than it was receiving from revenue sharing and so, by
1993 it had become a net contributor to the Republic.
20agency coordination problems, lack of funds, and general lack of interest on the part of
users due to low tariff levels were all blamed for the program's  lack of success.24
111.2  Political Factors Working Against  Water Reform
Two  major  factors were  working against  a  radical reform  in  the  D.F.  water
system.  First, some  of the administration's  core constituents stood to  lose from any
reform that passed substantial responsibilities to the private sector.  Second, water had
long been highly politicized in Mexico in general, and the D.F. in particular, resulting in
tariffs set well below costs of service delivery. As we will discuss below, the government
chose a reform that did not, at least in the initial stages, require it to confront either of
these problems.  However, while these factors did not prevent the initiation of private
sector involvement, they  did  eventually prove  important in bringing the  reform to  a
standstill.  In this section we describe what these factors were and how they affected the
initial design of private sector participation; in the section on implementation we discuss
how they derailed the later stages of reform.
(i)  Potential  Winners and  Losers from  Reform.  The  distribution  of  potential
winners and losers of a reform depends on the exact reform to be carried out.  In this
section we will examine how a reform that passed substantial responsibility for the water
system to the private  sector might affect different interest  groups.  As we discuss in
sections IV and V the reform eventually chosen was a modest one that sought to mitigate
the effects of reform on potential losers.  Moreover, the reform as actually implemented
was affected by the efforts of potential winners, and more strongly by potential losers, to
modify the reforms and thus change the distribution of costs and benefits.
Those who might be expected to benefit from serious reform of the D.F. water
system included:  a) private  companies (domestic  and  foreign) who  expected to  win
contracts to  operate the  system; b)  residents who were  unconnected or  had minimal
service, and might expect expanded and/or improved service and; c) connected customers
whose service might improve and who valued those improvements more than any price
increases. National  politicians would also benefit  if the  federal Treasury made  fewer
24  Information  on the reforms  comes  from Schteingart  and  Torres,  1997,  supplemented  with  an analysis
of the data from the DGCOH Compendio,  1997 and field interviews.
21transfers to the D.F. water system, and thereby freed resources they could use for their
constituents.
Not all of these groups would weigh equally in the minds of the government. The
private companies were clearly important for the PRI as it sought to raise funds for the
upcoming 1994 campaign. The political pressure from those not connected to the system
had  diminished with the implementation of the participatory programs to bring water
services to the poor.  Both the level of the price rise necessary and the capacity to rapidly
increase service quality were  uncertain making benefits to  connected customers more
questionable.
Potential losers included: (a) current customers whose costs from increased prices
might outweigh the value placed on improvements in service (e.g. better quality water,
quicker connections, uninterrupted water supply, sufficient water pressure, rapid repair of
leaks, etc.); b) employees and heads of existing public sector agencies who might be laid
off or lose  stature or benefits and; c) politicians who might lose the ability to reward
supporters with jobs, investment contracts or increased water services.  Again the groups
varied in  importance to the  government and in  their willingness and  ability to  affect
reform design and implementation.  As we saw above the currently connected consumers
were a large portion of the public who might be  expected to  oppose any reform that
entailed large price increases without dramatic improvements in quality.  The public
sector agencies and  employees were  of concern due to the high rates of unionization
(which  increased  the  likely  incidence  and  effectiveness  of  broad  public  employee
mobilization against reform) and the experience of problematic union opposition in the
1988  elections  (Haber,  1996  and  Wiarda,  1988).  Lastly  a  large  number  of  local
politicians from the Delegados to the DDF Secretaries and the Mayor himself stood to
lose significant patronage power if reforms went ahead as planned.
As we shall show in the discussion of the implementation experience in Section
VI below, the net political costs of implementing all the stages of the contracts as initially
designed outweighed the net benefits to important Government constituents within the
D.F..  The result was a partial and selective implementation of the planned reform.
(ii) The Political Importance of  Water in  the D.F. The second factor working
against reform was the political sensitivity of water issues in the D.F..  This sensitivity is
perhaps reflected most strongly in the pricing of water services. As we saw in section 11.2,
22tariffs fell significantly below the cost of operation of services within the city and the
retail price of water had only been revised five times from  1970-1990.  The failure to
adjust prices in line with  costs occurred despite the fact that it led to large operational
deficits for the sector that had to be met out of the general budget.  Even more telling,
however, was the Federal Government's decision on charges for aquifer extraction in
1989.  The newly  formed national water authority, the Comision Nacional  de Agua
(CNA), undertook a study that attempted to estimate the cost of water in various zones
across Mexico based  on the relative scarcity of the water and the productivity of its
various uses (CNA, private  communication).  However when the Government set the
price of the extraction rights it did not apply the cost estimate from the study to all users,
instead it applied much lower rates to organizations which provided public services.  As
we will see in section VII, these rates are about two percent of what private parties pay to
extract water from the same aquifer in the D.F..
Water's  political  importance  is  also  reflected  in  legal  restrictions  on
disconnections.  Although article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 allows for the
government to  concession water rights  to  private  persons,  federal health  legislation,
passed in 1930s, bans the complete disconnection of residential users for non-payment.
In compliance with this law the Federal District Financial Code states that service can be
reduced to minimum "vital levels" but cannot be completely severed (Codigo Financiero
del D.F., 1997). In practice however, no residential consumers have ever had their service
reduced for non-payment in the D.F..  This is in contrast municipalities such as Monterrey
in the north of Mexico, where residential consumers who fail to pay have their supply
severely restricted as a matter of routine.
23IV.  DESIGN  OF THE REFORM
In this section we examine the design of the reform.  (In practice, as we will show
in the following section, the reform that was actually implemented differed in important
ways from the original plans.)  We begin with a discussion of the re-organization of the
sector, then we examine the design of the contracts and how this was affected by sectoral
and political constraints and finally we discuss the bidding and selection process.
IV. 1. Organizational Structure for Regulation and Operation
As noted above, the national water sector reforms decentralized responsibility for
regulating  water  and  sanitation  to  the  state  level,  with  the  creation of  state  water
commissions.  Responsibility for the administration and regulation of water resources at
the national level in Mexico Inow rested with the National Water Commission (CNA),
which the Salinas administration created in 1989 to oversee reforms in the sector across
the country.  It  is  the CNA,  for example, that takes  a primary role in planning and
administering major, interstate,,  bulk supply works; and that licenses, proposes the tariffs,
and collects charges for the abstraction of water from all water sources including wells in
the D.F.
CADF, Comision de Agua del Distrito Federal. CADF was created in July 1992
as  the  agency responsible  for  the  administration,  operation  and  maintenance of  the
infrastructure necessary for the provision of water, sewerage and drainage services within
the D.F..  Its responsibilities overlapped with those of existing agencies, particularly the
treasury, DGCOH and the delegaciones.  In the decree creating CADF these overlaps
were recognized and the relevant organizations are instructed to work with CADF and
"very slowly" transfer their responsibility to  it.  CADF was initially placed  under the
Secretary of Finance but  in  1994 (i.e. while reforms were being implemented) it was
transferred to the Secretary of Works and Services. Therefore the immediate effect of the
reform was to add yet another organization to the administration of the sector as can be
seen in Table 6.
24Table 6: Administrative Arrangements in the Water Sector Post-reform (1997)
Agency  Responsibility  Reports to
DGCOH  Construction and maintenance of primary  Secretary of Works and
water and sewer networks  Services (DF)
Delegaciones  Construction and maintenance and  Secretary of Government
operation of secondary water and  (DF)
sewerage networks.
CADF  Oversees contractors who are responsible  Secretary of Finance (92-94)
for meter installation, meter reading and  Secretary of Works and
billing  Services (DF) (94-present)
Treasury  Collections and transfer of budget to  Secretary of Finance (DF)
other  entities
CADF, upon its creation in 1992, took over the billing of the 20,000 largest users,
who were mainly industrial or commercial entities.  These customers represented only
about 2% of the consumer base and consumed an estimated 20% of total volume, but they
accounted for 53% of all collections. 25 They were targeted because they were easy to
identify, measure and enforce payment upon.  This policy largely ignored the residential
users who were responsible for about 75%26  of water use in the D.F., and therefore failed
to encourage a more rational use of water among most customers.
IV. 2 Private Sector Contracts
(i)  Contract  Design  The  chosen  reform  was  a  gradual  one  that  did  not
immediately involve any major challenge to the existing sector agencies.  Nonetheless,
the  stated  objectives  were  ambitious:  billing  all  customers  based  on  metered
consumption;  optimizing the use of resources; achieving cost recovery;  reduction of
aquifer extraction; improving the overall efficiency of the water sector; and achieving
sustainable improvements in services quality.  These goals were to be achieved through
ten-year service contracts with private consortia.  The service contracts were expected to
improve the financial performance of  the city's  water system  through more efficient
billing and collection and by reducing physical losses (water produced but not delivered
to customers) from an estimated 37 percent to 24 percent of total production over the life
of the contracts.
25  Interview with Director General of CADF, 1997
26  From  DGCOH,  1997b.
25Mexico City was divicled into regions or "zones," each of which would be let
under a separate contract.  In each zone, a private consortium would be awarded a ten-
year service contract. 27  The reasons for this  were  two-fold: to  promote  a  spirit of
competition among the contractors and to  reduce the risk of contract failure should a
single contractor renege on the requirements of its contract.  The number of zones was
not decided at the beginning of the process although the bidding documents did state that
at  least  two  zones  would  be, awarded.  The  contractors  were  asked  to  bid  on  the
assumption that they would service at least a quarter of the population in the D.F. and
they were instructed to include a table of discounts and surcharges in  case they were
assigned larger or smaller zones.  The zones were to be roughly comparable in terms of
population and have a minimum number of customers.
The  contracts  consisted  of  a  "menu"  of  tasks  involving  the  operation  and
maintenance of  the secondary water distribution and drainage systems, as well as several
other associated activities, such as opening customer service centers.  The tasks were
grouped into three stages and the D.F. provided each of the bidders with a detailed work
program complete with a projection of volumes of each operational task by delegacion
and semester for each of the ten years of the contract period.  The consortia were expected
to perform all of the tasks on the menu by the time the contract period ended.  Prior to
performing any of the tasks CADF must issue a specific execution order.  The private
consortium for a given zone would have the right of first refusal to execute orders in its
zone.  This allowed the D.F. to sole-source a number of relatively small batches of work
over time that otherwise would have been required by law to go to competitive tender.
This was a conscious decision on the part of the designers for three reasons: (i) to give the
contractors revenue security so they would undertake the other requirements that did not
lend themselves to short term contracting (i.e. customer service); (ii) to avoid the high
transactions costs associated with public bidding without sacrificing competition entirely;
and most  importantly, (iii) to progressively move responsibility  for all operations and
management of the secondary network to the private sector (field interviews).
27  Federal law required each private consortium to be majority owned by domestic Mexican companies,
which in the case of water paired up with a private international water company. According to the
bidding documents, the Federal Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of
Foreign Investment requires that power to determine management and control rests with a domestic
company. This requirement is backed by the Constitution.
26The tasks in the contracts were grouped into three stages:
Stage 1: Initial Activities
*  mapping of the secondary water distribution network
*  completion of a customer census
*  installation of meters for all customers
The objectives of Stage 1 were to obtain reliable information on users and the state of the
distribution  and  drainage  network  and  provide  both  operators  and  consumers  with
complete and reliable information on consumption levels.
Stage 2:  Customer-Oriented Tasks
*  regularization of billing (meter reading, maintenance and the sending of bills)
*  shared role in collection of bills
*  establishment of customer care centers and telephone care centers
*  connect new customers
The objectives of Stage 2 were to increase revenues, raise consumer consciousness about
the careful use  of water and the punctual  payment of bills, and  ensure billing  of all
customers.
Stage 3: Network-Oriented Tasks
- operation and maintenance of the secondary water and drainage networks
detection and repair of visible and invisible leaks (water and drainage)
*  rehabilitation and extension of the secondary network (water and drainage)
The objectives of Stage 3 were to improve the efficiency and quality of water distribution
and  drainage service to  consumers,  recover water previously lost  through  leaks, and
reduce operating costs.
In the first two stages of the contract the consortia are not directly exposed to
commercial risk, since payments are on a fee-for-service  basis.  In the third stage some
degree of performance-based remuneration was planned.
The contracts did not set out a firm timetable for progression through these stages.
However, according to the calendar of tasks used for bidding, stage 1 would begin at
signing and run for two years, stage 2 would begin approximately one year later and run
to the end of the contract, and stage 3 would begin approximately two years into the
contract, and also run for the remainder of the contract. The planned schedule is
illustrated in Figure 5.
27Figure 5: Schedulle  for Implementation of Contractual Stages








(ii) Influence  of Politics  on Reform Design.  The reforms were intentionally
designed so that the more politically controversial objectives would only be addressed in
the later stages. All of the key actors involved with the reform decision maintain that this
gradual approach was the only politically viable option (field interviews).28 Gradualism
had many advantages from the government's point of view.  It allowed the new sectoral
oversight body, CADF, time to build itself up while it was still non-threatening to more
powerful interests who were expected to oppose later stages of the reform. Gradualism
was also electorally convenient. The new contracts could be signed with large domestic
firms, helping to assure their support in upcoming elections. At the same time the later
stages of the reforms, where the contractors take over responsibilities for system
operations and were likely to make a significant  number of people employed by the
delegaciones  redundant, were not scheduled until after the 1994 Presidential elections.
The decision to design a staged reform can also be explained by the PRI mindset
at the time.  The reformers never seriously considered the possibility that the PRI would
not be in control of the D.F. government within the foreseeable future and therefore felt
little pressure to ensure that reforms were completed quickly (Field Interviews). The
28 There  might  have  been non-political  explanations  of this  decision  but they  seem  unlikely.  It was  not due
to lack of technical  capacity  to design  and implement  a more  complex  form of contract  since  complex
contracts  already  existed  in Mexico  City.  DGCOH  had contracted  out the operation  of several  water
treatment plants.  Lack of information was a problem, but this alone would not necessarily constitute a
barrier to a more inmmediate  reform, as had been shown by the concession in Buenos Aires in 1992.
28decision to leave the implementation of the more difficult parts of the reform to future
administrations, ultimately had significant costs, which we discuss in greater detail in
section VI.
IV.3  The Transaction
(i) The Selection Process.  CADF issued a request for proposals in  November
1992; bids were submitted in February 1993; a decision was made on the winning bidders
in March 1993; and the contracts were signed in September 1993.29
Although the pre-qualification criteria and basic parameters of the contract were
clearly specified, the number of zones was not  decided upon until after the bids were
received. 30  Bidders submitted price lists for each of the required actions in each of the 16
delegaciones. These detailed prices, as well as discounts and surcharges for zones larger
or smaller than 1/4 of the D.F., were then fed into a computer model, developed by CADF,
which computed the net present value of the cost of the actions for different numbers of
zones and different allocation of zones across bidders.  The model was then solved to
minimize costs, which dictated the selection of a single private partner.  The choice of
four zones was not, therefore, a direct output of the model.  Rather, the model was used to
identify the costs associated with using different numbers of zones, to identify the best
configuration of the zones, as matched with alternative private partners. 31  None of the
bidders interviewed had a very clear idea of how the modeling process worked.
There were seven bids in total.  The winning consortia and the zones in which
they operate are set out in Table 7 below. The losing consortia were GMD (Mexico) and
Biwater (UK), Tribasa (Mexico) and Thames (UK), and Geo (Mexico) and Aguas de
Barcelona (Spain).
29  CADF did not draw on external  advisers  to assist in the preparation  of the contracts,  nor did they
consult  widely with the major sectoral stakeholders,  the DGCOH  and delegaciones.  They did hire
Price Waterhouse  to examine the  financial portions of  the bids  submitted and make sure that all
bidders complied with the rules for bidding so that all prices were strictly comparable. (Ochoa, 1998)
30  Criteria included a requirement for a majority domestic presence in the bidding consortia, a minimum
capital of  100 billion pesos, and technical capacity and  relevant experience in urban infrastructure
provision in Mexico or overseas.
31  Informed sources report that the models calculations indicated that including 3 zones would not raise
costs dramatically above 2 but there was significant pressure to include a fourth company.  While this
was more expensive than 3 zones it was done. Field interviews, 1997-98.
29Table 7: Allocation of Service Contract Zones
Zone  Company  Consortium  Connections  Delegations
Partners  (Treasury  list 1992)
A  Servicios  de Agua  Grupo  ICA  (Mexico);  373,350  Gustavo  A. Madero
(North)  Potable  Compagnie  Generale  Azcapotzalco
(SAPSA)  des Eaux (France)  Cuauhtemoc
B  Industrias  del Agua  Socios  Ambientales  de  362,750  Venustiano  Carranza
(North-  (IASA)  Mexico  (Mexico);  Iztacalco
Central)  Severn  Trent  (UK)  Benito  Juarez
I____________________ ____________________  C  oyoacan
C  Tecnologia  y  Grupo  Bufete  Industrial  311,490  Iztapalapa
(South-  Servicios  de Agua  (Mexico); Lyonnaise  Milpa  Alta
East)  (TECSA)  des Eaux  Dumez  Tlahuac
(France)  Xochimilco
D  Agua  de Mexico  Grupo  Gutsa  (Mexico);  293,270  Alvaro  Obregon
(West)  (AMSA)  United  Utilities  (UK)  Cuajimalpa
Miguel  Hidalgo
Tlalpan
_________  __ ____________  _  ______  _____  _____  __  __  _M  agdalena Contreras
Source: Compiled  from CADF  Documents
Each of the task prices was supported by a breakdown in the expected direct costs,
indirect costs and profit. The bidders were asked to offer unit prices for each of the
specified tasks, which would be adjusted for inflation over the course of the contract.
(ii) Bidding  Strategies  and  The Pricing  of Risk.  In order to determine their bids, the
bidders had to price a basket of risks and responsibilities that were hard to calculate and
to compare. 32 In each stage the contractors were obliged to carry out a number of actions
for which they could not charge a fee directly and these costs had to be figured into the
direct costs for which the contractor could charge a fee. Each consortium also had to
evaluate the probability that they would, in fact, be allowed to carry out (and therefore
charge for) each action in each stage. For example, in stage two, the contract states that
contractors will be paid a separate fee for each of the following actions: a) meter reading,
b) meter maintenance c) emission of bills and d) new connections. Regardless of whether
these actions go forward, the contractors are obligated to: a) open a customer service
center for each 50,000 customers in their zone, b) establish dedicated phone service lines
32  The  bidders  took  quite different  approaches  to  pricing  their  bids; some  did detailed  preparatory  work  to
determine  the costlier  delegaciones;  others  took  rough  approximations  (for example,  bidding  higher
fees  for delegaciones  built on rocky  ground);  while  others  bid uniformly.
30and c) receive and process payments. Thus the weighted probability of the basket of
actions would then determine the amount of indirect costs that would be associated with
each action.  In essence this required an assessment of credibility for each of the promised
actions in each of the stages of the contract.
Because the first stage involved uncontroversial actions-- updating the user
registry, mapping the system and beginning the installation of meters -- there was little
doubt that execution orders would be issued during this stage. In the second and third
stages, however, this was not true, and the various consortia appear to have estimated and
priced these risks differently. This variation in the pricing of risk, combined with
different technology choices in the case of one contractor, led to wide variations in the
prices bid for any given action.  For example, one of the actions on the menu was fixing a
household leak including replacement of up to 1.5 meters of pipe, one contractor quoted a
price of 673 pesos while another quoted 1,866 pesos (CADF, 1998). Because the bids
were evaluated on the net present value of the total estimated package over the ten years
of the contract, these variations in the prices of individual works were not critically
examined. As we will see in section VI, this would lead to criticism and political
problems in the future.
V.  IMPLEMENTATION  EXPERIENCE
The D.F. reforms, as initially designed, were modest in scope - beginning with a
very limited role for the private sector in the delivery of discrete services associated with
improved  billing,  building  over  time  to  include  some  operation  and  management
functions associated with  the reduction of physical losses in the distribution network.
Modest  as these  plans  were,  the  reforms  as  actually implemented  were  even more
constrained.  Initial start up delays slowed implementation of this gradual reform even
more than expected, making unpopular changes more vulnerable to reneging.  Weakness
in the regulatory environment, particularly in sectoral coordination and the tariff setting
process, has also affected outcomes.  Finally, the original contracts were renegotiated in
1998, which has, in effect, changed their nature entirely from the original design.  We
first discuss the delays, then coordination and broader regulatory problems and finally the
renegotiation.
31VI. Delays
The reform was subject a number of delays. Although the winners of the bidding
were chosen in March of 1993, the contracts were signed only in September of 1993 and
the contractors did not begin operations until May of  1994.  These delays were then
compounded when the opposition party took power in 1997 and moved to renegotiate the
contracts, as we describe in section V 3.
There may have been a delay at the outset because of a contract dispute, although
accounts differ. According to Diaz, 1997, Ochoa, 1998 and some field interviews, the
GMD/Biwater consortium disputed the contract award claiming that  they should have
been chosen over one of the other consortia.  However GMD representatives declined to
discuss the matter and all high level officials interviewed, including the ex-Mayor and the
ex-Secretary of Finance, claimed to have no knowledge of the dispute (field interviews).
A second factor in the delay was the need for the CADF to work out, internally and with
the contractors the operational details of how the individual execution orders would be
issued and paid.
Political factors, however, were a  more important source  of delay.  As noted
above in section Im 2, Mayor C'amacho  was one of the leading contenders to become the
PRI presidential candidate and fully expected to be chosen.  He had little incentive to
jeopardize his base of support within the D.F. by pushing ahead with reforms that might
antagonize powerful  allies and strong labor unions at the time of the selection of the
PRI's  candidate in  1993. As  it turned out, on November 28,  1993 President  Salinas
announced that Donaldo Colosio was the official PRI candidate, and Mayor Camacho
resigned the next day.  This  abrupt departure led to further delays until a new Mayor
could be appointed.
The devaluation of the peso in December 1994 led to further delays.  Specifically,
the companies dramatically slowed meter installation because the budget which had been
allocated for the purchase of imported electronic meters by the D.F.  government was
insufficient at the new exchange rates.  In total these early setbacks meant that by 1997
the program was at least two years behind schedule (see Figure 6).  As we discuss in V3
below  the  renegotiation  of  the  contracts  in  1998  led  to  still  further  delays  in
implementation of stage three of the contracts.
32Figure 6: Revised Schedule for Implementation of Contractual Stages
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
First
Stage




V2. Regulation: Monitoring, Coordination and Tariff Setting
(i) Monitoring  and  Coordination.  The  absence  of  a  clear  and  effective  set  of
monitoring and enforcement arrangements in the D.F. has had an important effect on the
implementation of the  contracts.  CADF is the closest thing to  a  regulator,  since it
designed and monitors the service contracts, although it does not set tariffs. Although the
decree that created CADF implied it would have wide oversight responsibility for the
sector, it did not assign CADF the power to enforce its decisions.  Rather, CADF was
added to the existing organizations in the sector (DGCOH, Treasury and the delegacion
water departments).  As we will see in section VI this has resulted in significant overlap
and lack of coordination. 33 CADF has a more straight forward role vis-a-vis the private
contractors.  It assigns and monitors (or hires an experienced company to monitor) the
execution orders and must verify the work before the private contractor is paid by the
Treasury. It may assess penalties for unsatisfactory performance although this seems not
to have been a significant factor to date. 34 Confusing relations further is that fact that
33  One example of this is the fact that DGCOH, the delegaciones  and the contractors all maintain team to
repair reported leaks. Field interviews revealed that frequently teams from two or more organizations
show up at the same site to repair a reported leak.
34  While we were unable to get reliable information from CADF on the extent to which they used
penalties, contractors reported that being penalized was commonplace. Contractors maintained that
many of the fines were of low value and for very minor infractions and they thought that a better
approach would be to fine for significant failing in performance.
33CADF is in some ways in competition with the private operators. CADF reads the meters
of and bills approximately 20,000 large users and operates its own customer care center.
Approximately 65% of CADF staff are absorbed in this activity, which it does not plan to
transfer to private contractors.
CADF's lack of budget autonomy (its budget is part of the budget of the D.F.) can
hamper the efficient implementation of works by the contractors.  CADF's  budget is
expected to cover both the operating costs of the CADF and the service fee payments to
the private contractors.  All payments from clients and to contractors go through the D.F.
Treasury, hence CADF does not receive any direct benefit from increases in collections.
As a result of this arrangement when CADF funds were short because it had not received
its  budget  allocation  from  the  D.F.  Treasury,  which  was  common  in  1996-97, it
compensated by not issuing new execution orders (field interviews with contractors).  3
All of the contractors agreed that they could have accomplished much more if they
had been given longer term  and more comprehensive execution orders.  Typically an
execution order is good for only about two months and when it expires the contractors
should, in theory, wait for another to be issued before carrying out more work.  They
point out that many of the tasks they are performing (billing, collection, customer service)
are processes and not discrete actions and it would be costly for them stop when the
current execution order expires. It is therefore not uncommon for contractors to continue
to carry out work and meet the expenses associated with that work without a contract,
waiting several weeks or even months before a new execution order is issued and they are
paid.
CADF's  lack  of  authority  in  managing  the  sector  has  also  meant  that
responsibility could not be shifted to the contractors as planned. For example, the CADF
has never signed an execution order for new connections, an activity originally planned
for  Stage  2.  Instead  new  connections  have  remained  the  responsibility  of  the
delegaciones.  CADF claims  that new  connections must  first be  relinquished by the
delegaciones before responsibility can be  assigned to the contractors (field interviews).
The  failure  to  pass  this  action  to  the  contractors  means  that  the  newly  connected
customers do not receive water bills (as the information about those new connections is
35  By late 1998 most of the contractors said that delays had been minimized and that this was no longer a
significant problem.  Field interviews 1997-98.
34not  passed on time  or  not passed  at  all to  the contractors) and that  there are fewer
revenues from execution orders to finance the costs they cannot directly bill, which has
caused financial difficulties for at least one contractor.  36
(ii) Tariffs. Tariffs are proposed by CADF but decided on by the D.F. Assembly
and although all tariffs were increased in the early years of reform, they have since fallen
for most residential users. As Figure 7 shows, between 1996-1998 the metered tariff fell
even in nominal terms for users consuming between 30-100 m3 per bimester, these are
predominately residential consumers in the middle and upper classes.  In real terms
Figure 8, an even larger group of consumers, all those using between 30 and 220 m3 per
bimester or about 52.2% of all residential consumers, have seen 1998 tariffs substantially
lower than in 1996. It is difficult, however, to know exactly how many customers
actually noted these changes however because so few customers received bills based on
actual meter readings in 1996 (most "metered" bills were actually based on historical
readings, not actual readings).
Figure 7: Residential Metered Tariffs in D.F. 1996-1998 (Current Pesos)
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Source:  Codigo Financiero del Distrito Federal 1996  & 1998
36  The contractor  in question  was  by far the most  aggressive  in pricing  its bid. While  this made  them
number  one in the bid assessment  it has meant  that they  are working  on a substantially  narrower
margin than their competitors and therefore are much more susceptible to financial difficulties due to
the lack of implementation of any given action in the contract. They have reportedly lost millions of
dollars due to this problem during the second stage.
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This tariff reduction  for metered residential customers was combined with  an
increase in the cross subsidy from non-residential to residential consumers.  Numerous
documents, including  water bills  and public reports  produced by  the  CADF and the
DGCOH refer to this lowering of rates as a boon to residential consumers. 37 At the same
time non-residential consumers have faced steadily rising prices in real terms in each
revision,  leading  to  the  grow-ing price  differential  shown  in  Figure  9.  Since non-
residential consumption accounts for roughly one-quarter of total consumption, average
real metered prices have dropped.
Figure 9: Residential Metered Tariffs as a Percentage of
Non-Residential Metered Tariffs  (1996 vs 1998)
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Source:  Codigo  Financiero  del Distrito  Federal  1996  & 1998
37  DGCOH, 1997a. CADF water bills 1997.
36Two factors explain the fall in real metered water tariffs in this period.  First, in
December of 1994 of the peso was devalued, eventually falling to about 50% of its former
value against the dollar.  Because the 1995 water tariffs had been set earlier in 1994 they
did not keep pace with the high inflation that occurred post devaluation.  In an effort to
limit the fall in real prices the D.F. assembly (controlled by the PRI) approved a large rise
in the water tariff for  1996.  By the time the new rates came into effect in  1996 the
economy had entered a steep recession and any price rises were extremely unpopular. As
we pointed out  above, in  1996 most residential consumer's  meters were not regularly
read. Thus the combination of the price changes and receiving bills based on actual usage
(which was often much higher than "historical" readings) meant that many consumers
perceived a large price  shock.  This in turn  contributed to  the second factor affecting
prices, the increasing politicization of tariffs.  The D.F. Representative Assembly was
granted the power to approve (and modify) the D.F. budget, including proposed water
tariffs, in 1994. Although the PRI had a majority in the Assembly the public outcry over
the tariff change following the devaluation increased the Assembly's sensitivity to raising
tariffs.  Politically, it was difficult for representatives to the Assembly to justify a rise in
water tariffs during a period of rising inflation, falling wages and diminishing purchasing
power.  For example, in real terms the minimum wage fell by  19% and the average
manufacturing wage  fell by 24% between  1994 and  1996 (World Bank,  1998).  The
assembly, and the PRI more generally, became more sensitive to this in the run-up to
elections in July of 1997. (For a more complete discussion see section VI.5).  As a result
tariff setting has been more subject to intervention and, since 1996, the Assembly has
routinely adjusted tariff structures proposed by CADF.  In most cases the assembly has
allowed the non-residential rates to rise while keeping residential rates below inflation
leading to real declines in residential tariff rates.
V3. Renegotiation
Implementation of the contracts was severely disrupted by the entry of the first
democratically elected, and opposition led, govermnent of the D.F..  When the new PRD
administration took power in December 1997 they were very skeptical of the contracts.
Initially, they believed that the contracts had not been properly designed. There was a
serious risk that the new government might try to cancel the contracts altogether.  After a
careful and critical review, the new administration decided to maintain the contracts but
amended the parameters of stage three (see details below) and, more significantly, revised
the prices applicable to the execution orders in the third stage.
37As noted above, the bidding process had resulted in significant variations in prices
between contractors for the samne  works.  This was considered unacceptable by the new
Government, which initially attempted to renegotiate all of the prices.  A majority of the
contractors (although not all) refused to re-negotiate prices for on-going works such as
metering and billing, but did agree to review prices for stage three, which had yet to start.
The new administration obliged all bidders to charge what was considered as a market
rates and coincided in most cases with the lowest bidder's  rates on nearly all actions
already in the contract for stage three, and set prices for new actions that they wanted to
add. 38 Reportedly, the administration took the position that the general contract simply
gave the contractors the right of first refusal for new actions and that they could either
accept these new prices or see the work contracted out to third parties. 39
As a result of the re-negotiations stage 3 progressed but it is highly unlikely that
the contractors will be given full control of operations and maintenance of the secondary
network  as  originally envisioned.  Instead the new  administration  chose  to  use  the
contractors to supplement existing organizations to improve the system by making them
more active in leak repair and in upgrading or repairing the secondary network on a fee-
per-action basis.  In other words, the spirit of the original stage three -more responsibility
of the private sector for improving operations - has now been lost.  New actions have
been added, but since these are on a fee-per-action basis they do not redistribute risk and
reward between the public and private actors.
38  This  was  true for most,  but not all, actions.  In at least  one case  the government  agreed  to prices above
those  of the lowest  bidder. The implication  being  that  the bidder  severely  underestimated  the actual
cost of the work  in their  original  bid. However  the goverrnent did not allow  this low  (below  cost)
bidder  to collect  the newly  agreed  price for  the action,  but instead  insisted  they be reimbursed  at the
price  they  bid originally,  despite  the fact  that  the government  agreed  to a higher  price with  the three
other  consortia.
39  This  does appear  to  be the stipulation  in the bidding  documents  ("base  de licitacion").
38VI.  REFORM OUTCOMES
One of the objectives of the reform was to increase information on the customer
base;  another  was  to  raise the  economic viability  of  the  system  through  expanded
metering,  better  billing  and  higher  rates  of  collection,  which  would  help  curb
consumption  and  raise  revenues.  A  third  important  objective  was  to  improve  the
incentives of the operators to raise the quality of service delivery to consumers, to recover
water previously lost through leaks, and to reduce operating costs. As we have seen these
objectives were to be accomplished by progressively passing more responsibility to the
contractors so that, by the third stage of the contract, they would be responsible for all
operations and maintenance of the secondary water and drainage networks, including
detection and repair of visible and invisible leaks, and rehabilitation and extension of the
secondary network.  During  this  phase  it  was  intended  that  remuneration  of  the
contractors would move to efficiency-based payments based on a combination of their
operating and system efficiency (i.e. reductions operating costs and in UfW) and their
collection efficiency.  As we will see, however, none of these responsibilities have been
passed to the private contractors and the evidence to date shows that there has been little
improvement in either quality of service or operational costs and that cost recovery has
scarcely improved.
In this  section we analyze the impact of the reforms on information, metering,
billing and collection, service and efficiency of operations.  Then we examine the way in
which politics contributed to  these outcomes.  Since the reform is still underway our
conclusions about the outcomes are necessarily provisional
V  1. Information
One important accomplishment of the contracts was to improve information about
the water distribution system and the client base in the D.F..  Thanks to the contracts, the
D.F.  now  has  an  electronic map of  the  entire water  system  for  overall planning,  a
customer census that has allowed regularization of previously unregistered connections
and meters for most customers.
It  seems reasonable to  attribute the information improvements to  the contracts
since earlier efforts to  use the existing government  agencies to  improve information,
39register customers, expand metering and read the meters once installed had failed.  The
dispersion of authority across numerous public agencies and the entrenched nature of
their workforce had made  reform difficult.  The split in  responsibilities between the
delegaciones, which connected customers, and the D.F.  Treasury, which  billed  them,
allowed many  customers  to  be  added  to  the  system  but  not  to  the  registry.  The
participatory programs described earlier added to the problem by extending semi-formal
connections in many poor neighborhoods.  Moreover, although prior to the contracts up to
53% of registered consumers had meters, because of technical problems and corruption
most users paid a flat fee or were billed on "historical" meter readings (field interviews).
The water census, completed in  1996, yielded an  average increase in  existing,
although  still  unregistered,  connections  of  about  22%  (Table  8).  The  increase  in
registered connections was far from uniform across the city and the large variations show
the extent of the information deficit that existed previously, particularly in the South-east
(Zone C) where one out of every three connections was not registered.
Table 8: Changes in Registered Connections and Metered Billing
% change  in  Connections  % of total
Treasury  CADF  total  number  of  billed  on  with
List (1992) (Aug  1998)  registered  users  metered  basis  metered
Company Zone  (Aug.  1998)  billing
SAPSA  A  (North)  373,350  410,681  10%  316,020  77%
IASA  B  (North-Central) 362,750  411,269  13%  314,838  77%
TECSA  C (South-East)  311,490  446,249  43%  167,159  37%
AMSA  D (West)  293,270  346,605  18%  258,785  75%
CADF  Large  Users  NA  19,689  NA  13,576  69%
11,340,860  1,634,493  22%  1,070,378  65%
Source:  CADF
VI2  Metering, Billing and Collection
Nearly 1.2 million meters were installed as a result of the reforms (Table 9).  As
of June 1998, 64% of customers were billed on a metered basis while another 16% were
billed the average of the metered customers in their zone. 40 This is a major improvement
on the pre-reform state of affairs where, because of the large number of unregistered
40  The D.F.  financial  code  states  that  once  metering  has  reached  70%  in a given  zone  then the remaining
un-metered  customers  can be billed  for the average  metered  use in  the zone.
40connections, at least 22 percent of customers did not receive a bill at all and those that did
were being billed  a  fixed rate, irregardless of usage.  Again the  South-Eastern zone,
which is the poorest and has the lowest water and service quality, has experienced serious
difficulties in metering and billing, as of August, 1998 only 37 percent of their customers
receive a metered bill (Table 8).  To address previous technical problems and corruption,
the new meters can be read electronically and are less subject to failure.
Table 9: Installation of Meters
Number  of Meters Installed Total Cumulative  Number
Year  of Meters  Installed
Type  A  Type  B
1993  - - 1,699
1994  168,007  45,903  215,609
1995  189,365  20,108  425,082
1996  177,779  134,665  737,526
1997  196,438  117,036  1,051,000
|Mid- 19981  38,909  66,5481  1,156,457
Source:  Author  estimates  based  on data  provided  by  CADF  and  Secretaria  de Obras  y Servicios
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Billing has improved substantially since meter reading and billing was taken over
by the contractors under CADF (Figure 10), with total number of bills growing by about
26% over the period. The amount billed has also risen, by 205% in nominal terms.
41Despite these improvements, information on payment of water bills is still poor, a
result of the sector's  fragmented administration.  Customers can pay their water bill at
one of the 24 customer centers run by the contractors, one of the Treasury's offices or one
of hundreds of designated bank branches.  Only the Treasury is in a position to aggregate
payment data for the entire system.  For about a year after the contractors began taking
over billing there was no information sharing arrangements and contractors sent out bills
but had no idea which customers actually paid at the Treasury's offices or at the banks.
Only  in  late  1998  did  the  Treasury begin  sending  information  on  receipts  to  the
contractors.  Unfortunately, this information is still received late and continues having
many problems originating from mistakes in the manual capture processes of the Treasury
so that many payments cannot be matched with the corresponding receivables.
Although the reforms did much to improve billing, they did little to increase the
incentive for bills to be collected. The private companies are paid only for producing and
sending out  the  bills,  not  for  collecting money;  although  they have put  effort  into
reminding and encouraging customers to pay.  While their efforts have helped somewhat,
the  responsibility for  collection still  rests with  the D.F.  Treasury.  Not  surprisingly,
Treasury's incentive is to maximize the District's resources.  Since the Treasury collects
all taxes and fees levied by the District government, it focuses its attention on the single
largest source of revenue, general taxes.  General taxes, particularly property and payroll
taxes, accounted for 25% of total revenues in  1996.  In contrast, revenues from water
collection were only 5% of revenues that year.  Also not surprising is the fact that the
Treasury has always focused its efforts in water collections on the very large customers
who provide high returns to their collection efforts (Ley de Ingresos, 1995). This lack of
significant improvement has led the CADF to institute its own program to help collect
past arrears, sending letters to people who owe more than 500 pesos, but it is too early to
know how effective this will be.41
This separation of responsibilities and misalignment of incentives has meant that
total collections have barely improved.  Although in nominal terms collections increased
by over 150% between 1994 and 1998 (Figure 11), they have increased by only 7% in real
terms over the same period (Figure 12). The collection rate (total collected / total billed)
has actually fallen during the reforms (Table 10) reflecting the increased billing activity
4'  The response to over 300,000 letters sent in July 1998 suggests that only about 3% of outstanding arrears
were paid, in part because 40 to 50%/6  of the customers  turned out not to be in arrears.
42of the private contractors  which  has not been matched by the public  sector  agencies  in
charge  of collection.
Table 10: Collection Ratio 1994-1998 (Thousands of Pesos)
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997  Est. 1998
Total Billed  914,844  1,115,375  1,667,476  2,376,804  2,787,472
Total Collected  766,000  807,521  1,140,000  1,589,701  1,930,240
Collection Rate  84%  72%  68%  67%  69%
Figure 11: Amounts Billed and Collected (Current Pesos)
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Figure 12: Amount Billed and Collected (Constant Pesos)
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43VI.3  Service
The effect of the contracts on service has been mixed. The contractors expanded
the number of customer centers, and respond more rapidly to questions on billing and
meter readings or to reports of leaks or lack of water.  Furthermore, the operators have
opened a total of 24 customer service centers and each has telephone hotlines in their area
(Ochoa, 1998).
Service  problems  remain,  however,  including  poor  quality  of  water  and
interrupted service, especially in the southern and southeastern portions of the city.  As
we  saw  above  the  reliability  of  water  services  is  still  the  responsibility  of  the
delegaciones; hence the contractors have had little effect on this aspect of service, which
has  not  improved  markedly.  Even by  1998, neighborhoods  in  nine  of  the  sixteen
delegaciones continued  to  suffer routine cuts in  service, although the severity of the
problem and the number of people affected varied widely.  We can illustrate the problems
by examining two of the worst affected delegaciones, Tlalpan and Iztapalapa.  In Tlalpan
43 out of 192 neighborhoods received water only two to three days a week usually for
eight to ten hours a day; an estimated 30% of the population were affected (DGCOH,
1998 and field interviews).  In Iztapalapa about 40% of the population were affected by
the cuts; some received water as infrequently as one day a week for as little as 6 hours
(field interviews).
In addition to the poor service in these sections of the city the quality of the water
is also extremely poor.  In part this is due to the ground water in the area which has high
concentrations of manganese but in part it is also because the Southeastern section of the
city is the last to receive water brought in from the Cutzamala system.  The combination
of  frequent interruption§ in supply and poor quality  local water means that the water
delivered is often of very poor quality and in some sections of the southeast residents
have to run their tap for several minutes before using the water as it initially runs black
due  to  the  high  sediment  content.  To  combat  these  problems  the  DGCOH  was
implementing a  plan  to  treat  water at the well-head  in  these  locales and  there  is  a
longstanding plan  to  extend  the  southern branch  of  the  Cutzamala  aqueduct  to  the
southeast of the city.
44A  related  effect  of  such  poor  service  is  to  reduce  revenues.  Because  of
interruptions in service and the poor quality of the water many of these customers are
charged on a fixed rate, regardless of the fact that many also have meters, in line with
CADF's policy of not introducing metered billing where service quality is poor.  The flat
rates are set according to the income tax classification of the area and for most of the
affected areas is between 11.75 and 17.65 pesos per bimester.
VI.4  Operating Efficiency
(i) Sector Management. The reforms did little to change the organization of the
sector, and fragmentation of administration of water services remains a serious problem.
As shown in Table 6, CADF and the private operators were simply added to the existing
organizations operating in the sector. Although the initial decree that created CADF gave
it wide sectoral oversight powers, it did not give it any powers of enforcement over the
existing organizations, nor  did  it change the organization or responsibilities of these
organizations (DGCOH, Treasury and the delegacion water departments).  As  a result
there continues to be significant overlap, duplication and lack of coordination, which, in
turn, lead to inefficiencies in the use of resources. 42
The  inability  or  unwillingness of  successive D.F.  governments to  unify  and
streamline the many public agencies in the sector or to link budgetary resources to clear
efficiency indicators has blunted their ability to use private sector participation to improve
efficiency.  Since the reforms effectively added the private contractors to the existing
agencies, they have not resulted in cost savings.  As a proxy for administrative efficiency
we examined the working ratio (operating costs/operating billed revenues) of the system.
As can be seen from Figure  13, the D.F.  compares unfavorably with  a range of water
systems in Latin America.
42  One example  of this  is the fact  that  DGCOH,  the delegaciones  and the contractors  all maintain  teams
to repair  reported  leaks. Field  interviews  revealed  that  frequently  teams  from  two or more
organizations show up at the same site to repair a reported leak.
45Figure 13: Comparison of Working Ratios for Various Countries
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(ii) Operating Costs. Not surprisingly, operating costs have not decreased as the
reforners  intended; rather  they have increased in  real  terrns over  the  reform period
(Figure 14). The budgets  of the DGCOH and the delegaciones were not  significantly
affected by the reforms, and the DGCOH accounted for an average of 90% of the total
operating budget in water from 1992 to 1998 (Figure 14).  Hence, it would be unrealistic
to expect costs to fall when the largest entity in the sector has not been required to reduce
its operating budget over the reform period. 43 Since the contractors have not yet been
given the operational responsibility envisioned for Stage 3 in the original design of the
contracts, there  is little  time  left to  correct the  situation and  achieve any significant
reduction in operating costs in the rest of the project time frame.
43  There were some reductions in the water budget in 1995-96, but these were in response to problems
caused by the devaluation and were not sustained.
46Figure 14: Operating Costs of the D.F. Water System
(Millions of Constant 1997 Pesos)
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NOTE. Operational  Costs  includes  Labor  Services,  Materials  & Supplies,  General  Services,  Aid/Subsidies
& Transfers  and  Consumer/capital  goods. It does not include the money  expend in the account "Public
Works  " as this was  considered  an investment  rather  than  an expense.
(iii) Cost Recovery.  Since costs did not fall and tariffs did not increase, it is not
surprising to find that the system still does not  cover its operating costs, although the
level of cost recovery did improve modestly from 64% in 1993 to 71% in 1998 (Table
11).  Because the water system is financed as part of the government budget rather than
on a commercial basis and all loans and financial charges are handled directly by the D.F.
Treasury, we  do  not  have full infonnation  on  the total  outstanding debt or  interest
charges. We cannot, therefore, examine how far the system is from generating enough
revenues to recover all costs including debt service, and provide a reasonable return on
investment.
Table 11: Operational Cost Recovery in the D.F. Water System, 1993-1998
Thousands  of Current Pesos
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Revenue
Collected  471,400  596,000  766,000  807,521  1,140,000  1,589,701  1,930,240
Operating
Expenses  878,252 926,544  1,017,073 1,262,310 1,624,505 2,494,149  2,709,792
Operational
Cost Recovery  54%  64%  75%  64%  71%  64%  71%
Ratio  I_I
Operational Cost Recovery Ratio= Operating Revenue Collected/Operating Expenses
47V7.5  Influence  of Politics on Outcomes
As we saw above in  section three, the reform design was shaped  by political
considerations, but political  pressures became more pronounced during the course of
implementation and hence affected outcomes.  As a result, reform steps that would have
been politically challenging in  the best  of circumstances, were  even more difficult to
implement.  In this section we will quickly re-state the potential winners and losers from
the reforms as proposed then we present a chronological examination of events which
helps to reveal the ways in which the changing political environment affected the reforms.
The potential winners  from reform were: a) private  companies  (domestic and
foreign) who might win a contract; b) residents who were unconnected or had minimal
service, and might expect expanded and/or improved service; c)  connected customers
whose service might improve and who valued those improvements more than any price
increases; and d) national politicians who might benefit if the  federal Treasury made
fewer transfers to the D.F. water system, and thereby freed resources they could use for
their constituents.  Potential losers included: (a)  current customers whose costs from
increased  prices might  outweigh  the  value  placed  on  improvements  in  service; b)
employees and heads  of existing public sector agencies who might be laid off or lose
stature or benefits and; c) politicians who might lose the ability to reward supporters with
jobs, investment contracts or increased water services.
Importantly the political gains or losses associated with the reforms would accrue
at different points  in  time.  With  the exception of the  private  companies, potential
winners would only be rewarded in the medium to long term as the reforms progressed.
Therefore they might not be aware of the potential gains (e.g. unconnected customers) or
would heavily discount the expected gains which may or may not actually accrue in the
future. Although potential losses to most groups also accrue in the medium to long term,
these groups are much more likely to be aware of the threat to their interests and actively
seek to block further reforms which might threaten them.  It is this interaction between
potential gains and loses and the immediate needs of the political parties that allows us to
track the effects of politics on the reforms.
A political economy timeline of reform.- In mid-1993, one year prior to a general
election, the PRI controlled govermnent of the D.F. chose to contract four private firms
for water services.  The choice of four contracts (as opposed to 2 or 3) was politically
48determined (see IV.3).  It stands to reason that CADF came under pressure to issue four
contracts because there were political benefits associated with them that were important
to the PRI heading into an uncertain election.  By announcing the award of contract (and
signing  them in  September)  the  PRI was able  to  quickly  capture  the benefits  from
contracting, support  and,  possibly,  contributions from  large  private  firms,  while not
materially affecting any of the potential losers.  The contractors did not begin operations
until May 1994, just two months before elections. In July 1994, the PRI was victorious in
presidential elections.
In December  1994, a planned devaluation went awry and the country entered a
severe economic recession.  With  inflation running  at  35  percent  in  1995 the PRI
controlled D. F. Assembly passed an increase in residential water rates for 1996 of over
50 percent in an effort to avoid large drops in the real tariff rate.  When the new water
tariff became effective in  1996 the recession was at its peak  and the rise was highly
unpopular leading to vocal criticism from existing customers, particularly since services
had not improved.
In 1996, facing elections in the D.F. Assembly and the first ever directly elected
mayor of  Mexico  City as well  as  both national  legislative bodies  in  1997, the PRI
changed tactics.  Abandoning fiscal rectitude, the D.F. Assembly voted for a large cut in
water tariffs for the middle  and upper middle class.  The tariff cut seems particularly
driven by the new political dynamics in the D.F..  By early 1996 it was clear that the
major threat to the PRI in the D.F. is the left wing PRD which is especially strong among
lower income groups.  If the water tariff decision in the D.F. is any indication, it appears
that the PRI consciously decided to abandon the fight for the lower income voters and
concentrate instead on voters in the middle to upper income brackets who they feared
might also defect to the PRD (Figure 15). In fact metered rates for the poorest consumers
(less than 20 m3) actually rose, while those consuming 20-25 m3 had no change.  The
rise in price for the poorest metered consumers was mirrored by price hikes of about 19
percent in the same year for non-metered residential customers, the majority of whom
were lower income.  In contrast wealthier metered customers, those consuming between
35 and 75 cubic meters per bimester, receive large price reductions, even more than the
price rises of the year earlier.
49Figure 15: Residential Metered Tariff Change, 1996-1997 (current pesos)
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Source: Codigo Financiero del D.F., various years.
In the same time period, 1996-97, the D.F. government made a series of decisions
that  delay the consolidation  of  sector management  under  CADF  as  foreseen in  the
original  reform  plans.  The  main  reason  for  this  was  the  fear  that  the  resulting
unemployment would be very costly politically.  For example, the government chose not
to implement portions of the second stage of the contract (e.g. passing new connections to
contractors)  and  further  delayed  the  passage  of  operation  and  maintenance  to  the
contractors.  Both of these reforms were expected to result in labor redundancies in the
delegaciones.  In an  already tight political  contest the  government had  no  desire to
antagonize public labor unions and add to already increased unemployment.
In the event however, none of these moves were enough to keep the PRI in power
in the D.F..  In July 1997, the PRD won the D.F. elections by  a landslide taking the
mayoral seat and a commanding majority in the D.F. Assembly.  The first ever election
for Mayor in  the  D.F. is,  however,  only  one of  a  series  of  changes planned  in the
movement to  fully representational local politics.  The full plan  is to  move to  local
election for municipal mayors (Delegado's) in stages between 2000-2003.  As a result of
the transitional arrangements, the first Mayoral term in office is shortened to just  three
years from the usual six and the Mayor will face reelection in 2000.  Beginning in 2001
the municipal mayors will be elected in each of the 16 delegaciones.  This means that the
current government has little incentive to push reforms, since they will incur significant
50up-front political costs, in terms of lost jobs in the public sector, but deliver gains only in
the long term.
In this context the PRD renegotiate the third stage of the contract, profoundly
altering the role of the private sector in the reform plan. Under the renegotiated terms the
contractors have been used up to now only to supplement the public agencies (i.e. detect
and repair leaks, carry out system maintenance, etc) not supplant them.  In this way the
PRD protects itself from accusations of causing unemployment while  still seeking to
improve the service in the water sector.  It also leaves the delegacion water departments
as  a  useful  political  tool  in  terms of  employment and  politically  motivated  service
delivery.
Barring  an  unforeseen  attempt  to  create  a  centralized,  autonomous  sector
administration, the political changes over the next few years will almost certainly further
fragment administration of the water system.  Since some districts routinely vote for one
of the three main parties (PAN, PRD, PRI) it is likely that different delegacion water
systems will be  run by rival  political parties.  This may politicize water issues even
further and make it more difficult to delegate responsibilities to the private sector.
VI.6  Accomplishments and Failings of the Contracts
Although the outcomes discussed above were far less than intended, the D.F. was
still better off with the private contracts than it had been before. The private contractors
produce much better information on the customer base and they install and read meters
with greater accuracy and more consistency, they bill more customers more accurately
and they are more responsive to consumer complaints. It seems unlikely that even these
modest changes could have been achieved without private participation.  Prior attempts to
reform the public agencies in the water sector had had no success, and there was little
political will for a reform that would have required restructuring and unification of the
government agencies in the sector.
The contracts failed to address some of the most serious problems of the sector,
however, and the prospects that these will be tackled in the future are few.  The reform
failed to improve efficiency, reduce costs, raise revenues or curb waste.  And, as we
discuss in the next section, serious water resource issues and equity problems remain.
51VII. Beyond the Reform: Unresolved Key Policy Issues
The  reform  planned  - and,  even  more  so,  the  reform  implemented  - in Mexico
City was very partial in scope.  As described above, it was not expressly designed to
tackle the most serious water resource problems confronting the city, though as originally
planned it would have had an important effect in curbing excess consumption and waste.
Similarly while the reform, at least as planned, was intended to increase efficiency in
service provision, which might have been expected to improve both service quality and
cost options for all segments of society, it was not specifically intended to improve the lot
of the poorest of the city's  citizens - who also happened to be those with the poorest
services at the time of the reform.  With these provisos in mind, this section considers
some of the incremental effects of the reforms as implemented on these broader policy
issues.  We first  consider its consequences for the negative externalities from water
consumption and water pollution,  second, we consider its effects on the poor.
VII.1 Social Costs of  Water Consumption
The reform did little to change the incentives of residential consumers to conserve
water,  despite  its  high  opportunity  cost  in  the  D.F.  The  increasing  rate  of
overexploitation  of  the  aquifer  was  reduced,  but  this  appears to  have  been  partly
accomplished by simply failing to meet expanding demand.
Overexploitation of the aquifer has been recognized as a problem since at least the
1  930s. It has generated a number of negative externalities, including:
1.  The cost to building owners of damage to their property from subsidence due to over
extraction;
2.  The cost to government of damage to public infrastructure (roads, pipes, etc) from
subsidence due to over extraction;
3.  The cost to future generations of current unsustainable use manifest through higher
costs in the future or diminished quality of life
4.  The cost of forgone use of water by the surrounding communities whose water is
being taken to the D.F.
5.  Raising the cost of nearby communities due to higher pumping costs caused by the
lower water tables (hence deeper wells) which are the result of overexploitation by the
D.F.
These costs have never been calculated for Mexico City, but as we will show, they are
probably very high, much higher than the prices charged by the municipal system.
52The period of the reforms did see a slowing in the growth in production of bulk
water from the aquifer, but not as a result of any change in residential demand. Between
1988  and  1998, total  water  produced  by  the  D.F.  water  system  remained  almost
unchanged at  about 35 m3  per  second, despite a  rise in  population  of  an  estimated
650,000 people over the decade.  This, combined with a policy of substituting water from
Cutzamala for ground water, reduced the rate at which water was pumped out of the
aquifer from 23.5 m3/second to 19.1 m3/second. This reduction in pumping, however, is
still  not  enough to  stop  the  subsidence of  the  city.  The  poor  data  available  on
consumption patterns make it difficult to pinpoint the exact source of this reduction, but it
appears to be the result of a reduction in non-residential demand combined the failure to
meet rising residential demand.
As we have seen the tariff rate for large metered users (who are mainly non-
residential) increased by nearly 65% in real terms between 1991-1998, at a time when
real prices for residential users, who are responsible for three quarters of consumption,
were  falling.  This  non-residential price rise,  combined with  the  effects of  a  severe
recession in 1995-96, appears to have reduced non-residential demand.  Thus, estimated
average consumption for the 20,000 largest users dropped by twenty percent from 1994 to
1998 (Figure 16).44 This translates into over 23 million cubic meters per year or about
.74 m3 per second.
Figure 16: Average Consumption of Large Users 1994-1998
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Source: Author's  Calculations  using  CADF  data.
44  The imnplied  price elasticity  of demand  is well  within  the estimates  found  in numerous  demand  studies.
For a good  summary  of these  studies  see Abdala,  1996.
53Although the state of the data makes measurement difficult there is little reason to
expect that residential water demand declined during this period, given that real prices
were falling.  Rather, a growth in rationing and an expansion in the proportion of the
population with lower propensity to consume probably explain much of the flat level of
production not explained by the drop in non-residential consumption.  Much of the D.F.'s
population  growth  has  been  in  the  southern  districts,  which  have  lower  per  capita
consumption in part because they have the highest rate of rationing of water and in part
because they are poorer  and hence are less likely to have gardens, washing machines,
multiple bathrooms, etc.  From  1990 to  1995 (the last year of available statistics) the
population of the northern and central delegaciones, which have much higher per capita
consumption of  water,  shrunk  by  nearly  one  percent  per  year,  while  the  southern
delegaciones grew by an average 2.7 percent per year (INEGI 1997).
The most  important reason for the failure to  make further progress in curbing
consumption is that water tariffs were far less than the opportunity cost of water.  We
have already shown that water tariffs did not cover operating costs, although it can be
argued that operating costs were much higher than those of an efficiently operated utility.
We can illustrate how  far tariffs were from the economic cost  of water by using the
charges CNA applies for extraction right from private wells, which are based on a 1989
study by the CNA of the relative scarcity of water and its alternative uses.  In 1997, for
example, the CNA charged private well operators 7.96 pesos per m3 that they pumped
out of the aquifer, while the DGCOH paid only 0.14 pesos per  m3, or less than two
percent of  the private  cost.  The discrepancy is not  especially surprising in  that the
charges, while proposed by the CAN,  must be approved by Congress.  Since most of the
water system operators are still owned and run by publicly owned municipal companies
or departments, a rise in the charge to public operators would mean a rise in the operating
budgets of these public entities and a consequent rise in consumer prices or government
subsidies.
If we assume that the price CNA charges the private users is a reasonable proxy
for the real economic cost of water from the aquifer in the D.F. (and according to CNA it
is probably an underestimate), then we can compare the economic cost of water from the
aquifer with  the price paid by the public  sector.  That calculation yields an effective
subsidy of over 4.7 billion pesos in 1997 (Table 12), more than the entire budget of all the
D.F. water agencies that year.  If we add to this the CNA's estimate of the economic cost
of water from other sources (Cutzamala or Lerma), then the total subsidy rises to over 8
54billion pesos.  If we further assume that operating costs and physical losses (which are
about 37 %) remain constant, then the average tariff would have to rise to 15.3 pesos per
m3,  or about US$  1.93 at  1997 exchange rates, to cover costs.  In contrast the actual
average tariff (calculated as revenues billed divided by m3 water produced minus physical
losses) in 1997 was 3.4 pesos m3 or about US$0 .43.
Table 12: Financial and Economic Costs of Raw Water in the D.F., 1997
Difference in the Financial and Economic Cost of Raw Water in the D.F.,  1997
Source  Production Public-  Economic Public-sector Economic  Difference
(1997)  Sector  price Price  cost  cost  (millions
(millions m3)  (97 pesos)  (97 pesos)*  (millions pesos)  pesos)
Wells  603.6  0.14  7.96  84.5  4,804.6  4,720.1
Cutzamala  313.5  1.42  7.96  445.1  2,495.2  2,050.1
Lerma  154.2  0.85  7.96  131.1  1,227.5  1,096.4
Springs  25.5  .14  7.96  0.0  25.5  25.5
Total  1,096.8  664.3  8,730.7  8,066.4
Weighted  Avg.  0.61  7.96
* as estimated by CNA.
To understand the importance (and the economic cost) of the current high rate
physical losses (37 percent) we re-calculated the prices that would have to be charged if
losses fell to 20 percent.  The price that would then need to be  charged to  cover the
economic cost would fall from  15.3 pesos to  12 pesos.  To look at it another way, if
physical losses could be reduced to 20 percent this would lead to a saving of over  186
million cubic meters per year or  5.9 m3 per  second.  This is more  than the current
Cutzamala extension project is bringing to the city at a cost of over 500 million dollars.
However,  as  long  as  the  D.F.  administration  does  not  itself  face  the  full  cost  of
developing and transporting new external water supplies to the city - or the full costs
associated with subsidence in the city from over-use of the aquifer - the incentives to
pursue such savings are likely to remain weak.
VII.2 Costs of Wastewater and Sewage Disposal
The disposal of wastewater is a second issue that was not directly addressed by the
reforms - and remains a major problem for the city.  The sewerage system contributes
55about 26-28 m3 of wastewater per second, which is equivalent to 75-80% of the total
water produced (Joint Academies, 1995).45  There are 21 treatment plants around the D.F.
with a nominal capacity of 5.9 m3/second.  In  1997 these functioned at an average of
50.8% of capacity  or about  3 m3/second, which suggests that  just  over  10% of all
wastewater was treated.  The treated wastewater is used mainly for the watering of public
parks (83%), as well as some industrial and commercial uses (12%) and a small amount
for irrigation (5%).  The remaining 90% of the wastewater is pumped north, out of the
D.F.  and  into  the  state  of  Hidalgo where  it  is  used  to  irrigate  80,000  hectares  of
farmland. 46 This state of affairs leads to two problems, the negative health effects of
irrigation with untreated sewage and pollution of an abundant water source.
Health Effects.  In  1991 the federal government, recognizing the health risk of
irrigating with untreated sewage, banned the practice for surface crops or crops that are
eaten raw.  This legislation reduced the health threat, but it violated the principal that the
polluters should pay for the cost of dealing with their pollution to give them an incentive
to pollute less.  It passes some of the cost on to consumers in the form of higher prices for
these foods. Although some of these consumers may be in Mexico City, the source of the
pollution, they are unlikely to be aware of the link between untreated wastewater and food
prices, so it would not affect their willingness to pay for sewage treatment.  The rest of
the cost is borne by farmers who either have to invest in new crops or find clean water to
irrigate the same crops. These farmers, who are not even in the same state, are unlikely to
have much influence over the D.F. policy towards sewage treatment.  Finally the failure
to treat the D.F. sewage means that the rivers and streams that receive the runoff are still
polluted, which is a threat to the health of people who live near these waters and use them
for drinking, fishing, bathing and washing clothes.
Pollution of Water Sources.  The failure to treat the wastewater has consequences
for the aquifer as well.  Because the D.F.  drainage system combines the runoff from
rainfall with sewage, storm runoff cannot be used to recharge the aquifer.  Since Mexico
City is located at the bottom of a valley, much of the city is naturally predisposed to
flooding.  As a result the thousands of cubic meters of rainwater which fall on the city
45 Because the drainage system in the D.F. is combined (i.e. sewage and storm water) the amount of
wastewater  produced fluctuates drarnatically  depending on the season.
46  Joint Academies, 1995 and DGCOH, 1997a.
56during the rainy season (up to 120 m3/second) is pumped out of it out of the city at great
cost.
The DGCOH has carried out studies of ways to improve the system's capacity to
treat and reuse water as well as to recharge the aquifer through injection wells or to
recharge reservoirs and has developed medium to long term plans to increase treatment
and recharge.  Without a proper accounting of the economic costs of water usage and a
rise in consumer tariffs to cover these costs, however, it is unlikely that such efforts will
have much effect.
VII.3  Effects on the Poor
While we cannot measure the income effects of the reforms directly because of
the poor state of the data, we can extrapolate their impact on people in different socio-
economic strata by examining how their water bills changed due to the reforms.  We can
also draw some inferences about the extent to which changes in bills were accompanied
by changes in service quality.  Briefly, the primary effect of the reform in this context was
to improve the efficiency of billing (which, for the prevailing tariff structure, meant an
increase  in  bills  for  some  poor  households),  without  offering  any  significant
compensatory improvement in service quality - or the promise of such improvements.
(i)  Effects  by Socio-economic  Group.  One  of  the  effects  of the  reforms  was  to
increase metering, which changed the size of consumer's  bills as shown in Figure 17.
Prior to the increase in metering most bills bore little relation to consumption and instead
were based on flat rates for different zones, those in the lowest tax zone (presumably the
poorest) were not billed at all.  As a result of the flat rates many consumers received
similar bills despite highly varied consumption. For example, in 1991, 55% of consumers
received bimonthly bills of between 35-60 pesos.  In  1998 most bills were based on
actual, metered consumption.  As Figure 17 shows, this raised water bills for the lowest
consumption levels, which are often (though not always) the lowest income levels, and
left bills unchanged or lower for many of the middle and upper consumption levels.
47  The  1991 data is based  on the distribution  of tax codes  which determined  the flat rate  applicable  to
water consumption,  while the 1998 data is from actual  billings.
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Service quality and consumption are both highly correlated with income in the
D.F., since many of  the wealthy who  have high water consumption  due  to  modern
conveniences (multiple  toilets,  washing machines,  swimming pools,  etc)  live  in  the
central and  western portions  of  the city which  have good  quality service.  We can
therefore illustrate how the reforms affected different socio-economic strata of society by
examining three  fairly  homogeneous  delegaciones that  broadly  represent  the  lower
income/consumption (Milpa  Alta),  middle  income/consumption (Azcapotzalco)  and
upper income/consumption (Benito Juarez) areas.  Naturally, with  areas this large it is
impossible to  categorize all people in the delegacion but the findings can be taken as
broadly representative.  Table 13 compares the costs of water for households in constant
1998 pesos for the pre and post reform periods.  The pre-reform prices are calculated
based on  fixed charges by  tax classification while post-reform prices  are from  1998
billing data.
58Table 13: Changes in Real Household Bills, 1991-1998
LOW  INCOME
De/egation:  Milpa  Alta  (100% Unmetered  Connections  In  Jan/1998)
AMOUNT  BILLED  (98 Pesos)
0  10.00-12.00 12.01-18.00  18.01-35.00  35.01-  Over
PRE-REFORM  (1991)  100%  -
POST-REFORM  (1998)  - 100%
MIDDLE  INCOME
Delegation:  Azcapotzalco  (81%  Metered  Connections  And 9%  Average  Metered  In  Jan  /1998)
AMOUNT  BILLED  (98  Pesos)
10.00-18.00  18.01-35.00  35.01-60.00  60.01-150.00  150.01-  OVER
PRE-REFORM  (1991)  - - 98%  2%  -
POST-REFORM  (1998)  17%  26%  21%  28%  8%
HIGH  INCOME
Delegation:  Benito  Juarez (81%  Metered  Connections  And 19%  Average  Metered  In Jan  /1  998)
AMOUNT  BILLED  (98  Pesos)
10.00-18.00  18.01-35.00  35.01-60.00  60.01-150.00  150.01-  OVER
PRE-REFORM  (1991)  - - 11%  70%  19%
POST-REFORM  (1998)  12%  25%  27%  26%  11%
Low Income Consumers.
Consumers in Milpa Alta were billed about 12 pesos a month in 1998. This was a
big change from 1991, because Milpa Alta is in the lowest rated tax zone, their tariff was
zero.  So for resident of  Milpa Alta the change was to  actually receive a water bill
although  it  is  still  not  related  to  their  consumption.  Milpa  Alta,  which  remains
completely  unmetered,  is  an  extreme  example  of  the  effect  on  most  low  income
consumers.  The majority of low income consumers were paying a flat rate of ten pesos
per bimester prior to  reform.  For the most part these areas continue to receive non-
metered fixed bills, hence it is unlikely that their consumption patterns have been affected
by the reforms.  The only noticeable effect of reforms in most poor areas is a rise in the
number of people who actually receive a water bill.
Middle Income Consumers
If Azcapotzalco  is any guide, the water bills for over 40%  of middle income
consumers were  lower with  the introduction of  metering, while  34% faced modestly
59higher bills. Our data do not tell Us the extent to which bills went down because they were
being overcharged before meters were introduced or because real prices declined.
High Income Consumers
Similarly, many consumers in high-income areas such as Benito Juarez found that their
water bill stayed the same or decreased in real terns.  In Benito Juarez some 37% of
consumers were paying 50-75% less in 1998 than they did in 1995.
(ii) Affordability.  At  current tariffs, piped water  is  likely affordable but  not
always  available for the  poor in  the D.F.  leaving many consumers  to  rely on more
expensive sources.  Using the 1998 tariffs, combined with census data, we estimate that
non-metered water bills  for even the poorest  households with  any reported  income 48
would equal about 2 percent of their monthly salary - which is well within the bounds of
any traditional definitions of affordability. 49 Our calculations for a metered household
that consumed 15 m3 per month also equals just 2 percent of the monthly salary. 50
However, the poorest sections of the D.F. are also the least well served by the
current system in terms of the quantity of water, the quality of water and the continuity of
service.  For example, the delegacion water department in Iztapalapa estimates that they
have a deficit of over one cubic meter per second, equivalent to 86,400 m3 per day of
unmet demand (field interviews).  We have already seen that interruptions in service are
commonplace in poorer areas. To compensate for these deficiencies people in these areas
substitute expensive bottled water for drinking or buy water from private water trucks.
The cost of water from these vendors in September 1998 ranged between 33 and 66 pesos
per cubic meter. 51 This is in contrast to the 1 peso per cubic meter price for all customers
who use less than 10 cubic meters per bimester and a maximum of 20.3 pesos per cubic
48  This includes only households that report income, obviously for the 3.9% who report no income any
positive price is unaffordable.
49  Using 1998 minimum salary and income (reported as number of minimum salaries) from the 1995
census and the lowest fixed tariff.  We have assumed, conservatively, that a household had no more
than one income earner.
50  15m3 was used because it is double the estimated minimum safe level of 50 liters per day (Joint
academies, 1995) assuming 5 member households which is the average in the D.F.  There is also
evidence that the poorest in the D.F. currently consume only 20 liters per day. (Joint Academies,
1995)
51  The cost of a 6 m3 tanker in Itztapalapa in 1998 was between 200 and 400 pesos implying 33-66 per
m3.  Field interviews.
60meter for residential consumers.  To put it another way; the marginal cost per cubic meter
for people in some of the poorest neighborhoods of the D.F. is between 64% and 228%
higher than the marginal cost for the largest residential consumers.
In sum, then, there were  a number of key policy areas in the sector which the
reforms did not explicitly address, including resource scarcity, treatment of wastewater
and improvement of access and quality of service for the poor.  It is difficult to imagine
any future reform being effective without dealing with these issues.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS.
Although the reforms  generated a  significant amount of information about the
system which has begun to replace largely fictitious "estimates" with real numbers, the
overall impact on the sector has been very limited by comparison with the magnitude of
the  problems  it  faced.  The  main  problems  that  existed  prior  to  reform  were  not
addressed: (i)  fragmented,  costly  and  inefficient  administration  of  the  water  system
resulting in high  costs, poor  service and low returns; and  (ii) economically irrational
pricing of water and pollution resulting in high levels of consumption and waste and low
levels of treatment of waste water and low levels of reuse of treated water.  Certainly
these  problems  were  institutionally  and  politically  difficult  to  address  - involving
challenges to powerful interest groups (the existing agencies, labor, and consumers who
had  long  enjoyed  significantly  under-priced  water),  and  requiring  fundamental  and
politically difficult decisions about water pricing.  In addition, the D.F. itself had neither
clear jurisdiction nor clear incentives for resolving the major problems of water resource
and pollution management.  The difficulty of reform has risen with the political changes
of the  mid-nineties, and  is  likely to  rise  further with  the implementation  of a  fully
democratic local government that could further fragment administration along party lines.
The  service  contract  model  used  in  Mexico  City  offers  only  low-powered
incentives to the private partners to improve efficiency or service quality. The contractors
assumed little to no commercial risk and receive no significant rewards or penalties based
on their performance.  The public agencies operating in the system had no incentive to
work together, nor  were their budgets  based  on clearly defined  efficiency indicators.
Moreover, the progressive shift of responsibility to the private operators envisioned in the
61original contract did not happen, and is now highly unlikely.  Accordingly, relatively few
of the expected benefits will actually be captured.
The reforms also failed tc exploit fully the opportunities for competition presented
by the use of competitive bidding for the contracts, and the division of the city into four
zones. Although the D.F. had the necessary ingredients for competitive bidding, the
structure of the auction did not really use competition to reduce costs to consumers or
motivate efficiency. The decision to choose four contractors on the basis of bids for
actions which might never, and in the event will never, take place, meant that the bids
were not strictly comparable. As a result the expected benefits of competition,
particularly lower costs and more accurate information about prices, were not achieved.
Since the zones were also not structured to be comparable, it is relatively difficult to use
yardstick competition.  In particular, the network in zone C in the Southeast is in worse
repair than the others, and both water quality and service quality are much lower.
Nevertheless, it might be possible to benchmark delegaciones from zones that share
similar socio-economic and water system characteristics, such as Milpa Alta  and
Cuajimalpa, which are both rural, low density areas with low metering, and Benito Juarez
& Cuahtemoc, which are relatively wealthy, with high per capita consumption and a high
degree of metering. If these comparisons could be tied to a system of rewards and
penalties it would help improve performance. In practice, little attempt was made to take
advantage of the potential for yardstick competition, or to identify ways of making
legitimate comparisons between zones.
As political change progresses in the D.F. and each of the 16 delegaciones elects
their  own  municipal Mayor  it is  likely  to  become  more difficult  to  pass  increased
responsibility to private sector operators.  The short length of the current administration
(a  half term  of  3  years)  is  not  conducive  to  implementation  of  politically difficult
decisions.  It is unlikely therefore that there will be  any significant movement toward
further reform until after 2003 when the current contracts will be ending in any case.
The experience  of the  D.F.  suggests a  number  of  lessons  for policy makers
elsewhere:
1.  It is possible for a water system to be in a state of  "crisis" for very long periods of
time without triggering genuine reform, especially if water and wastewater services
are not priced in accordance with their opportunity costs.  This is largely because the
62resource is not visible to the general public and therefore its increasing scarcity is not
widely appreciated.  This lack of knowledge makes politically costly reforms, such as
price rises, extremely difficult.
2.  Gradualist reforms that defer politically difficult decisions or leave them to future
governments involve a high risk that the reform will not be implemented as originally
intended.
3.  Service contracts, which  are  often portrayed as  a  stepping stone  to  management
contracts, leases or concessions, do not necessarily create circumstances that make
further reform more likely.  In fact, the experience of firms to date, particularly with
politically motivated  pricing and  unpredictable re-negotiation, may actually make
further private sector involvement less likely.
4.  The use  of bidding  for the  market - or  the use  of multiple  zones  - are not  in
themselves  sufficient  to  sustain  a  competitive  environment.  For  competitive
pressures to be created and maintained, attention must be paid, first, to making the
basis of the bidding highly transparent,  and, second, to the development  of clear
benchmarks,  and  agreed  processes  for  benchmark  comparisons,  and  associated
allocation of penalties and rewards.
5.  Fragmentation  of  water  system  management  among  many,  poorly  coordinated,
politicized  public  agencies  makes  reform  much  harder  to  implement  and  the
realization of potential benefits less likely.
6.  In the  absence of prices  that correctly signal the  scarcity and  cost  of a resource,
including the relative prices of treated to new water, attempts to change behavior will
not  succeed.  The price signals  must apply to  all  actors in  the system, including
governments, operators and consumers; thus, large central government subsidies to
the local government will be a barrier to greater efficiency.
Thorough-going reforms aimed at achieving a more equitable and sustainable
water delivery system in Mexico City would need to focus not only on major efficiency
improvements in the operation of, and investment in, services within the city, but also,
more broadly, on substantial reform to the way in which water resources are priced and
allocated in the city and the surrounding region, as well as in the design, management and
pricing of wastewater services. This would need to inzlude reductions in federal
subsidies for new production, higher prices for system operators as well as consumers,
and large investments in the treatment and storage of wastewater. None of these changes
63is likely without strong political leadership, both within the D.F., and in broader national
water policies.
64ANNEX 1.
Electoral Reforms in Mexico
Year  Reform  Result
1977  Reformed the Federal Law of Political  This reform raised the level of
Organizations and Electoral Process  opposition participation in the lower
(LOPPE) by:  house from about 17% (1964-1976) to
*  Increasing the number of majority  about 26% (1977-1985)
districts for Federal Deputies from
about 200 to 300 seats.
*  Setting aside an additional 100 seats
to be allocated to opposition parties
on a proportional basis.
1982  President de la Madrid established new  The acceptance of opposition control of
policy of accepting municipal-level  municipalities was a large change but
right-wing (PAN) opposition victories  the de la Madrid administration would
but state-level victories still not  not accept electoral gains of left-wing
allowed.  parties in Oaxaca.
1986  President de la Madrid issues new
electoral code. Basic changes include:  More increases in representation of the
*  Winning party cannot obtain over  opposition but they are given by the
70% of total lower chamber seats.  government not won at the ballot box.
*  Proportionately allotted seats
increased from 100 to 200. (total
lower house increased from 400 to
500)
*  Opposition can gain 40% of seats
(200) without winning any majority
districts.
*  Party that gains largest number of
majority seats must be given a
simple majority of the lower house.
*  50% of senate to be elected every 3
years (instead of whole senate each
6 years)
Source: adopted from Camp 1996, with additions from Gomez Tagle 1993
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